The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

761. Mr Straw told Mr Ivanov that his “strong hope was that negotiations in New York

would lead to a resolution that all sides could vote for”, and:

“… underlined that the resolution could not be used as a pretext for unjustified

military action … the reference to ‘all necessary means’ had now gone. In its place

stood OP11 and OP12. The issue would now have to go back to the Security

Council to decide what action was required.”

762. Citing the differences in view about the legal basis for the No‑Fly Zones in Iraq,

Mr Ivanov said he wanted to “avoid situations of ambiguity” and “repeated that he did

not want to see the resolution … used unilaterally for military action”.

763. Mr Straw responded that:

“… there was no intention of using force unless it was absolutely essential. If the UK

sought the use of force, then it was likely that Russia, France and China would want

it too.”

764. Following a warning from Sir Jeremy Greenstock on 1 November that there

was a risk that China, France and Russia would veto the resolution, intense

negotiations on the precise wording of the draft resolution continued between

P5 capitals and in New York.

765. Reporting his discussions in New York on 1 November, Sir Jeremy Greenstock

said that he had told the US delegation: “We could be close to a Russian/French/

Chinese deal to exercise a triple veto because of OP4.” (They were concerned that

OP4 could be a trigger for military action.)257

766. Sir Jeremy questioned whether OP4 was useful given that: “With any negotiable

OP4, the Council would have to ‘establish’ or ‘assess’ any material breach leading to

potential argument and constraining our flexibility.” He had suggested losing the OP and

moving the reference “to false statements or omissions in the declaration” to OP11.

767. Mr Grainger sent a copy of the text of the US draft resolution of 1 November to

Mr Brummell on 4 November, saying that Mr Wood would be in touch.258

768. The draft text of OP4 included text additional to the draft resolution of 23 October,

stating that in the event of a further material breach, “the Council shall convene in

accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12” of the draft resolution.

769. The reference to the Council’s warnings “that Iraq will face serious consequences

as a result of continued violations of its obligations”, OP2 in the draft of 23 October, had

been moved to the end of the resolution, and became OP13 in resolution 1441.

257 Telegram 2097 UKMIS New York to FCO London, [01] November 2002, ‘Iraq Resolution: 1 November’.

258 Note (handwritten), Grainger to Brummell, 4 November 2002, attaching text of US draft resolution.

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