3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
there was
still a chance for him to make a last minute decision to leave or
genuinely
yield all
his WMD. The UK:
“… wanted a
further Council decision because we wanted it to stay in control
of this
issue.
Saddam’s assertion that he had no WMD made benchmarks a
pipe‑dream –
how could
we benchmark something the Iraqis said did not exist?
Having
unanimously
adopted 1441, we could not go back to extended inspections
under
1284 … The
fact … that Iraq was not fully co-operating – was the point. If
colleagues
believed
that Iraq was co-operating fully, then it was justified to vote
against the text
or amend
it. If they voted against the text for any other reason, they were
denying
what was
unanimously agreed in resolution 1441.”
754.
Sir Jeremy
concluded that the US was focused on preserving its room
for
manoeuvre
while he was “concentrating on trying to win votes”. It was the
“middle
ground”
that mattered. They “resent[ed] being forced to choose” between the
P5
and wanted
“to come to an objective judgement”. Mexico and Chile were the
“pivotal
sceptics”;
and “effective arguments (and intelligence evidence) to show that
Iraq’s zero
is a huge
lie are going to be more productive … in bringing them
over”.
755.
Sir Jeremy
also reported that an UNMOVIC contact regarded letters
received
from the
Iraqis in the last few days, which included names of people
involved in the
destruction
of VX, as showing that the Iraqis were trying to be
active.
756.
The UK
considered that the Franco/German/Russian proposals
were
“misconceived”.
757.
The UK viewed
the Franco/German/Russian approach as “misconceived”.
A telegram
to posts setting out the UK position on 26 February:
•
Questioned
the assertion that there was no evidence that Iraq still
possessed
WMD. That
was a “Fundamental misunderstanding of the inspections
process”,
which had
“to date left very large questions unanswered – particularly about
Iraqi
chemical
and biological programmes”. It was “not for others to prove that
Iraq
has got
WMD, but for Iraq to prove that it has not, through full, immediate
and
active
co-operation with the inspectors as required by resolution 1441”.
It was
“an
extraordinary statement”. “Substantial evidence”, including the
September
dossier,
had been presented “of continuing Iraqi programmes and
capabilities”.
•
Described
Secretary Powell’s presentation to the Security Council on 5
February
as having
“offered extensive evidence of Iraqi activities to hinder
inspections”.
In
addition, in relation to specific provisions in resolution 1441,
“no interviews
have taken
place with individuals … under the conditions requested”; the
Iraqis
had
complied with the requirement to provide names of personnel
“partially,
belatedly,
and under pressure”; and the inspectors had faced
“obstruction
and delay
in attempting to search sites”. For example, on 16 January
they
were
obstructed by Iraqi officials when they attempted to enter a
scientist’s
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