6.2 | Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

385. On 11 February, Mr Bowen sent Sir David Manning a revised draft of the UK’s

military campaign objectives, incorporating comments from Mr Straw and Whitehall

departments.133 The draft stated:

“The UK’s overall objective for the military campaign is to create the

conditions in which Iraq disarms in accordance with its obligations under

UNSCRs and remains so disarmed in the long term.”

386. The Coalition’s main tasks in support of that objective were to:

“a. overcome the resistance of the Iraqi security forces;

b. deny the Iraqi regime the use of weapons of mass destruction now and in

the future;

c. remove the Iraqi regime, given its clear and unyielding refusal to comply with

the UN Security Council’s demands;

d. identify and secure the sites where weapons of mass destruction and their

means of delivery are located;

e. secure essential economic infrastructure, including for utilities and transport,

from sabotage and wilful destruction by Iraqis; and

f. deter wider conflict both inside Iraq and the region.”

387. The UK’s wider political objectives in support of the military campaign and the

immediate military priorities in the aftermath of hostilities are addressed in Section 6.5.

388. The MOD comments on the draft objectives focused on whether they provided

“enough top cover to derive appropriate CDS and targeting directives to enable us to

work in coalition with the US”.134

389. On 12 February, the Chiefs of Staff noted that work on the UK objectives paper had

been concluded, but not finally endorsed. The paper would be “ready for release at the

start of any offensive campaign”.135

390. Mr Hoon discussed the objectives with Secretary Rumsfeld in Washington on

12 February.136

391. Sir David Manning sent a copy to Dr Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s National

Security Advisor, on 14 February.137 He explained that the UK military campaign

objectives were “compatible but not identical” to ‘Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy’

(a US document handed to Sir David by Dr Rice on 31 January – see Section 6.5).

133 Minute Bowen to Manning, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign Objectives’ attaching Paper

Cabinet Office, February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign Objectives’.

134 Letter Lee to Bowen, 4 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign Objectives’.

135 Minutes, 12 February 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

136 Letter Manning to Rice, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign Objectives’.

137 Letter Manning to Rice, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign Objectives’.

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