The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
It was
noted that pursuing the Hermes system could also potentially
“disrupt” the
Watchkeeper
programme because it could involve the same
contractor.
902.
Mr Ingram
was advised that a third option had emerged: the creation of a
Joint
Predator
Task Force with the US, using US equipment but drawing on UK
manpower
to support
an additional US Predator in the UK’s Area of Responsibility (AOR).
It was
viewed as
“the most promising option” in terms of performance, cost and
time.
903.
As training on
the Predator took at least 40 days, it had already been agreed
that
RAF
personnel would begin the next available course starting on 2
February.
904.
Mr Ingram
received an update on what became the Combined Joint Predator
UAV
Task Force
(CJPTF) on 30 April.479
An official
wrote that a drawback of the proposal had
been “the
inability to provide a full capability until the turn of 2004/05”,
largely because
sufficient
Predator ground stations were “not available until
then”.
905.
While the US
expected, “depending on the circumstances”, to allocate
increasing
amounts of
existing Predator time to the UK AOR as the UK’s participation in
the
CJPTF grew
from June 2004, “there would be no immediate solution to the
existing
capability gap”.
906.
The official
wrote that it had “therefore been agreed” to provide an interim
solution
by fitting
a datalink to five Nimrod MR2 equipped with the necessary sensors.
The
datalink
equipment would be loaned by the US and would “enable the Nimrod to
provide
near real
time imagery to ground stations in a manner very similar to
Predator”.
907.
That solution
could not be sustained “beyond the turn of the year” because all
five
Nimrods
required “major servicing” and the official accepted it was not a
cost‑effective
solution to
the capability gap.
908.
On 22 June,
Lt Gen Ridgway wrote to Mr Hoon, at his request,
with advice on
ISTAR
capability in Iraq.480
He
wrote:
“We
currently have no aerial surveillance capability available in
theatre – this is
a significant
capability gap.”
909.
Lt Gen Ridgway
asked Mr Hoon to note that:
•
Phoenix had
performed well but had been withdrawn for the summer
months.
•
Nimrod MR2
was providing “some” photographic capability.
•
Desert
Hawk, the mini UAV, was non‑operational for technical
reasons.
That was being
investigated and it was possible that Desert Hawk
would
become
operational again later that year.
479
Minute
DCRS4 to PS/Minister(AF), 30 April 2004, ‘Op TELIC Wide Area
Surveillance – UK‑US
Combined
Joint Predator Task Force (CJPTF)’.
480
Minute CDI
to APS/SofS [MOD], 22 June 2004, ‘ISTAR Provision to Op TELIC – UK
UAV Operations’.
154