The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“The
publicity surrounding the document was such that it devalued the
input of
the
Agencies. It was counter-productive in that attention was
distracted from the
concealment,
intimidation and deception of the Iraqi regime.”108
256.
Commenting on
the FAC conclusions in its response, the Government
stated:
•
It
disagreed that the February dossier had “undermined the case for
war”:
“As the
FAC itself says, the information in the February document was
important.
The overall
accuracy of the document has never been challenged.”
•
Mr Blair
“did not misrepresent the status of the document. It did
contain
intelligence
material … from a range of sources and was regarded by
the
[intelligence]
Services involved as reliable and significant. The
introduction …
makes clear
that the document draws on a number of sources, of
which
intelligence
was one.”
•
It
acknowledged that “mistakes were made and lessons have been
learned.
Amendments
made to the text were in line with information obtained from
other
sources and
did not undermine the accuracy of the document.”
•
“Ministers
take full responsibility for all papers presented to Parliament
that
explain the
Government’s foreign policy …”109
257.
Secretary
Powell gave a long and detailed presentation to the
Security
Council on
5 February setting out the US position on the threat posed by Iraq
and
its failure
to comply with resolution 1441.
258.
In his
presentation to the Security Council on 5 February, Secretary
Powell stated
that he had
asked for the meeting for two purposes:
•
The first
was to support the “core assessments” made by Dr Blix
and
Dr ElBaradei.
•
The second
was to provide “additional information and to share … what
the
United
States knows about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, as well
[as]
Iraq’s
involvement in terrorism”.110
259.
Secretary
Powell stated that the information “when combined with what all of
us
have
learned over the years” was “deeply troubling”. There was “an
accumulation of
108
Intelligence
and Security Committee, Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments,
September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 135.
109
Foreign
Secretary, The
Decision to go to War in Iraq. Response of the Secretary of State
for Foreign
and
Commonwealth Affairs, November 2003,
Cm6062, paragraphs 21-24.
110
UN Security
Council, ‘4701st Meeting Wednesday 5 February 2003’
(S/PV.4701).
342