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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
255.  The ISC concluded:
“The publicity surrounding the document was such that it devalued the input of
the Agencies. It was counter-productive in that attention was distracted from the
concealment, intimidation and deception of the Iraqi regime.”108
256.  Commenting on the FAC conclusions in its response, the Government stated:
It disagreed that the February dossier had “undermined the case for war”:
“As the FAC itself says, the information in the February document was important.
The overall accuracy of the document has never been challenged.”
Mr Blair “did not misrepresent the status of the document. It did contain
intelligence material … from a range of sources and was regarded by the
[intelligence] Services involved as reliable and significant. The introduction …
makes clear that the document draws on a number of sources, of which
intelligence was one.”
It acknowledged that “mistakes were made and lessons have been learned.
Amendments made to the text were in line with information obtained from other
sources and did not undermine the accuracy of the document.”
“Ministers take full responsibility for all papers presented to Parliament that
explain the Government’s foreign policy …”109
Secretary Powell’s presentation to the Security Council,
5 February 2003
257.  Secretary Powell gave a long and detailed presentation to the Security
Council on 5 February setting out the US position on the threat posed by Iraq and
its failure to comply with resolution 1441.
258.  In his presentation to the Security Council on 5 February, Secretary Powell stated
that he had asked for the meeting for two purposes:
The first was to support the “core assessments” made by Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei.
The second was to provide “additional information and to share … what the
United States knows about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, as well [as]
Iraq’s involvement in terrorism”.110
259.  Secretary Powell stated that the information “when combined with what all of us
have learned over the years” was “deeply troubling”. There was “an accumulation of
108  Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments, September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 135.
109  Foreign Secretary, The Decision to go to War in Iraq. Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, November 2003, Cm6062, paragraphs 21-24.
110  UN Security Council, ‘4701st Meeting Wednesday 5 February 2003’ (S/PV.4701).
342
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