The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
What major
questions does this raise?
•
Why is the
account … different from the intelligence picture before
the
conflict,
which was broadly agreed by virtually all Western Governments
…?
•
Why did the
Iraqi regime undertake such an extensive programme of
concealment
and deception at the UN? What were they trying to
conceal
and what
did they destroy?
•
Why, when
UNMOVIC returned to Iraq in 2002, were so many
obstacles
placed in
its way …?
•
Was
Saddam’s key aim … to preserve the capability to reconstitute
his
programmes
rapidly once UN sanctions were lifted …?
•
… Did the
fear of appearing weak drive Saddam’s continuing denial
and
deception
of the international community?
•
Did Saddam,
his colleagues and senior officials believe their own
disinformation?”
593.
Mr Scarlett
suggested a list of points Mr Blair could make in
public:
•
The ISG had
not so far found chemical or biological weapons or “evidence of
the
continued
production of such weapons, or that the nuclear weapons
programme
was being
reconstituted”.
•
It had
found “evidence of efforts to maintain BW and nuclear
capabilities”.
•
There was a
“lot of evidence of planning and design work for missiles
well
beyond the
permitted range”.
•
The ISG had
“also found evidence that equipment and documentation
were
destroyed –
including to deceive the UN inspectors in the final period
before
the
conflict – and that Iraq failed to declare activities or otherwise
comply with
Security
Council resolutions”.
•
The ISG had
a lot of work still to do.
594.
Those points
raised “some big questions including”:
“•
What was
Saddam trying to conceal and why did he take such risks to do it?
…
Why did the
regime continue to obstruct and defy the inspectors right up to
the
last
minute?
•
Was Saddam
Hussein trying to preserve his capabilities and programmes
while
trying to
get sanctions lifted as quickly as possible?
•
Were Saddam
Hussein and the Iraqi leadership properly informed
about
the state
of their WMD facilities? Were they being told the truth by
their
subordinates?
•
Why does
what we have found (or not found) differ from the
assessments
of Iraq’s
WMD capabilities accepted by most major Governments and
many
reputable
institutes pre-conflict?”
542