3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
destruction
capability has blocked that path …Only under recent intense
diplomatic
pressure,
and particularly the threat of military action, has the Iraqi
Government
letter of
16 September … emerged.”
520.
Sir Jeremy
stated that Iraq’s:
“… words,
while necessary, are of themselves not enough. We remain
deeply
perturbed
by evidence that Iraq believes it can hide its weapons of mass
destruction
rather than
declare them, that it can again fool the inspectors and play
games
with them.
The United Kingdom analysis, backed by reliable intelligence,
indicates
that Iraq
still possesses chemical and biological materials, has continued
to
produce
them, has sought to weaponise them, and has active military plans
for the
deployment
of such weapons. The United Kingdom analysis, backed up by
reliable
intelligence,
shows that Iraq has in recent years tried to buy multiple
components
relevant to
the production of a nuclear bomb. The United Kingdom analysis,
backed
by reliable
intelligence, points to the retention of extended‑range missiles
and to
the
employment of hundreds of people in projects to develop weapons
with a range
of over
1,000 kilometres that could carry both weapons of mass destruction
and
conventional
warheads.
“It would
be an abdication of responsibility to ignore this challenge to
the
international
community. We cannot afford to bury our heads in the sand
and
pretend the
problem does not exist. We cannot accept the Iraqi Government’s
word
at face
value, knowing what we know.”
521.
Sir Jeremy
stated that the UK wished “to see the Security Council …
express
its will
and its unity in a clear strong resolution”, which gave the Iraqi
regime “an
unequivocal
choice” to complete WMD “disarmament and normal membership of
the
international
community, or refusal and the inevitable consequences”. The offer
to Iraq
was genuine
and represented “a single final chance for Iraq”. If that was
understood and
the Council
kept its nerve, there might be:
“… a
prospect that Iraq will finally comply with its obligations and
that military action
can be
averted. If we fail to send that tough signal, we shall be ignoring
the realities.
The weaker
we collectively appear, the more probable it is that military
action will be
the
outcome.”
522.
Sir Jeremy
added that effective inspections were an “essential component” of
the
message and
there should be no return to the “ambiguous modalities” and
exceptions of
the past.
He questioned whether the language in recent Iraqi letters about
the practical
arrangements
for inspections was sufficient and called for the arrangements to
be made
legally
binding.
523.
Sir Jeremy
said he had “heard loud and clear the concerns of many speakers
that,
on a
decision so crucial, we should not rush into a war”; and that “any
Iraqi violations
must be
discussed by the Security Council”. If either Dr Blix or
Dr ElBaradei reported
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