The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
450.
Secretary
Gates visited Basra on 19 January and was briefed by British
officials
including
Maj Gen Shaw.244
The
American Forces Press Service reported a press brief
by the
MND(SE) spokesman who said:
“Our
political leaders are saying that if the conditions here continue
to improve, we
will have a
reduction in force in the spring.”
451.
On 19 January,
Mr McDonald wrote to Mrs Beckett with a report on his recent
visit
to Iraq,
which he said had left him feeling more optimistic.245
452.
Mr McDonald
judged that: President Bush’s new strategy had been well
received;
Prime
Minister Maliki was showing greater energy and looking more like a
leader,
including
by taking action against Sunni insurgents, the JAM leadership and
Iran; and
the latest
Baghdad Security Plan looked “more likely to succeed than its
predecessors”
because of
greater Iraqi ownership.
453.
Mr McDonald
commented: “Iraq will take a long time to put itself back together;
in
the end we
may not be able to prevent it from falling apart. Meaningful
reconciliation will
take a
generation.” He recommended deferring a referendum on Kirkuk’s
status, which
could be
deeply divisive.
454.
On Basra,
Mr McDonald considered:
“…
transition rather than Provincial Iraqi Control should be our
focus. PIC is a
somewhat
arbitrarily chosen event. If the process of transition is our
focus, our
record
looks better: completed in Muthanna and Dhi Qar, substantially
under way
in Maysan,
and beginning in Basra.”
“… what is
the minimum we have to achieve before we leave? I conclude
that
the answer
is to give Iraq’s nascent democratic institutions a fighting chance
to
overcome
the insurgents and foreign agents. We cannot give them more than
that,
and the
best way to help them now is to leave in a manner negotiated with
them.
If we
cannot announce a timetable (which would potentially transform our
relations
with MAS
[Muqtada al‑Sadr]) I recommend that departure be an explicit
aspiration,
say before
the end of 2007. We shall have to accept that the next phase, with
fewer
foreigners
about, may well be bloodier.”
456.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald commented to Cabinet Office and No.10 staff
that
Mr McDonald’s
concluding judgements looked “too
defeatist/minimalist”.246
244
News
Article US Department of Defense, 19 January 2007, ‘Conditions in
Southeastern Iraq Could
Lead to
British Force Reduction’.
245
Minute
McDonald to Foreign Secretary, 19 January 2007,
[untitled].
246
Manuscript
comment Sheinwald 20 January 2007 on Minute McDonald to Foreign
Secretary,
19 January
2007, [untitled].
84