3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
In his
memoir, War and
Decision,
Mr Douglas Feith, US Under Secretary of Defense
for
Policy,
described a meeting of the US National Security Council on 18
December 2002,
at which
the US response to Iraq’s declaration was
discussed.112
Mr Feith
described differences of view between President Bush and other
members of
the Council
about the position the US Administration should adopt in response
to the
discussion
of the Iraqi declaration of 7 December in the Security Council on
19 December,
and the
impact which describing the declaration as a material breach of
resolution 1441
would
have.
Mr Feith
reported that, after some discussion, President Bush stated that he
thought “war
was
inevitable”. President Bush was concerned that use of the term
material breach would
create an
expectation of military action and a debate about whether it was
sufficient for the
US to go to
war.
Secretary
Powell was reported to have taken a different position; and that he
had
suggested
the US should make its case to the Security Council that Saddam
Hussein was
not
co‑operating soon after Dr Blix’s report on 27 January
2003.
Mr Feith
reported that President Bush had reminded those in the room that
the point of the
7 December
declaration was to test whether Saddam would accept the “final
opportunity”
for peace
offered by the Security Council; and that he had summed up the
discussion by
stating:
“We’ve got
what we need now, to show America that Saddam won’t disarm
himself.”
327.
In his
update to Cabinet on 19 December, Mr Straw suggested that
the
Iraqi
declaration did not meet the requirements of resolution 1441 and
that the
next step
would be increased efforts by the inspectors to find the
evidence.
The
Security Council could be in a position to declare a material
breach by
27 January 2003.
328.
Mr Hoon
informed Cabinet that preparations were being made to be ready
for
possible
military action.
329.
Mr Blair
promised that there would be an “opportunity to discuss Iraq in
the
New
Year”.
330.
Mr Straw
reported to Cabinet on 19 December that Iraq’s declaration did not
look
as
“accurate, full and complete as the resolution required”; and that,
in particular, it failed
to explain
the material which had been “unaccounted for in 1998 such as: 360
tonnes
of bulk
chemical warfare agent; 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals; growth
media
112
Feith
DJ. War and
Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on
Terrorism.
HarperCollins, 2008.
61