The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Adm Boyce
wrote that, in Qatar:
“… the NCC
co-ordinates the activities of UK forces in theatre to ensure they
are
positioned
and resourced to carry out approved tasks. He will also identify
any
potential
changes to the plan that may impact on UK forces, and seek approval
for
any changes
from the JC [Joint Commander]. If the UK forces are at any stage
asked
to do
anything that we would not wish them to, the NCC is empowered to
intervene –
this is
known as playing the red card”.
Lt Gen
Reith issued a Directive to AM Burridge on 19 March which set out
the relationship
between the
CJO and NCC.20
That
stated:
“I want a
very clear understanding of the balance of responsibility between
our
two
headquarters. You are responsible for the integration of national
effort into
the
Coalition campaign. Your focus is to be forward and you are to act
as my
representative
in the CF HQ [Coalition Forces Headquarters]. In this
regard,
I underscore
the importance of ensuring a clear understanding of UK
capabilities
and
intentions within the Coalition and of monitoring closely, and
influencing, US
planning as
it develops. Within my intent and the powers delegated to you as
the
National
Contingent Commander, you have the lead in the direction of UK
forces
in the
execution of those tasks authorised by me. You are to keep me
informed of
the
situation in the JOA [Joint Operational Area], especially on
developments that
may affect
national political objectives or require changes to the ROE [Rules
of
Engagement]
or tasking of UK forces. My focus will be the OPCOM
[Operational
Command] of
the forces deployed and the definition of the national effort to be
made
available
to the Coalition campaign. Proposals for change to the agreed tasks
of the
joint force
will be authorised and resourced by me, informed by your
understanding
of Coalition
intent and your early identification of possible branch plans. In
this
I shall be
working closely with the MOD and the three single
Services.”
25.
Three UK
“Contingent Commanders”, Land, Air and Maritime, operated
under
the
national command of AM Burridge and the tactical control of US
Component
Commanders
“reflecting many years of NATO interaction and recent bilateral
experience
26.
Major General
Robin Brims, the UK Land Contingent Commander, reported
to
Lieutenant
General Jim Conway, Commander US 1st Marine Expeditionary
Force
(1 MEF),
who in turn reported to Lieutenant General David McKiernan,
Commander of
the
Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).22
Maj Gen
Brims was also
the General
Officer Commanding 1 (UK) Div during the invasion.
27.
Air Vice
Marshal Glenn Torpy, the UK Air Contingent Commander, reported
to
Lieutenant
General Buzz Moseley, the US Air Component Commander.
20
Directive
Reith to Burridge, 19 March 2003, ‘Joint Commander’s Directive to
the UK National Contingent
Commander
Operation TELIC’.
21
Ministry of
Defence, Operation
in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December
2003.
22
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 27.
8