10.2 | Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009

990. The Stabilisation Unit (formerly the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit – PCRU)

undertook a review of the Basra PRT in August, at the request of the FCO. The aim of

the review was to:

• assess whether the PRT’s objectives remained valid in the light of developments

since the Charge of the Knights; and

• evaluate the PRT’s performance.582

991. The “primary purpose” of the review was to ensure that the PRT functioned to its

full potential and delivered “tangible and sustainable benefits” over the next 12 months.

It seemed likely that the PRT would not exist in its current form once British troop levels

reduced in early or mid-2009, and that the US would take over the PRT at that time.

992. The Stabilisation Unit review reported that while all PRTs in Iraq were constrained

by insecurity and a lack of Iraqi capacity, the Basra PRT faced a number of additional

challenges:

“… a part-time leader since January 2007, a dysfunctional structural legacy, limited

resources, and an absence of a long-term strategy due to uncertainty over its future

ever since its creation in April 2006.”

993. Given those constraints, the Basra PRT had performed well in some areas, in

particular in securing Provincial Council ownership of the Provincial Development

Strategy and building Iraqi capacity on budget planning and execution. The PRT had

also responded well to reconfigure itself to support Mr Brown’s economic initiatives.

994. It was, however, clear that the PRT was not performing as well as it could.

It also needed to respond to the priorities set out in Mr Brown’s 22 July statement

to Parliament.

995. The Stabilisation Unit made 26 recommendations, of which one was highlighted

in the review’s Executive Summary: the appointment of a full-time Head for the PRT.

The Stabilisation Unit assessed that while the decision in 2007 to double-hat the

Deputy Consul General as the Head of the PRT had been reasonable, the increased

expectations on the PRT in the light of the improved security situation and from the

US, and the increased willingness of Iraqi citizens to meet members of the PRT both

on and off Basra Air Station, meant that “the PRT and PRT Head … could and should

be busier”. The double-hatting arrangement had led the US to express concern that

the UK did not attach sufficient importance to the Basra PRT, and that the PRT was

too concerned with delivering UK as opposed to coalition goals. The Stabilisation Unit

concluded that the arrangement was no longer credible.

996. Maj Gen Salmon reported on 7 September that, together with Mr Haywood and

the Head of the PRT, he had launched a re-orientated reconstruction programme with

582 Report Stabilisation Unit, 3 September 2008, ‘Review of the Basra Provincial Reconstruction Team’.

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