The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

786.  Addressing developments since 1998, the briefing stated that, “Despite tight

controls on imports”, Iraq continued “to pursue ballistic missile, nuclear, chemical and

biological programmes”.

787.  The detailed text was more nuanced, stating:

• “We believe that Iraq has recently accelerated its weapons programme.”

• There had been “continued progress” on the ballistic missile programme, and

facilities damaged in December 1998 had been repaired.

• Saddam Hussein was believed to be “planning to extend the range of his current

missiles beyond the 150km limit imposed by the UN”.

• There was concern about “reports of increased nuclear procurement”.

• “We think that R&D on a nuclear weapons programme has restarted.”

• “We believe that the Iraqi regime continues its biological and chemical weapons

programmes.”

788.  The briefing acknowledged that UN measures had:

“… played a vital role in frustrating Saddam’s ambitions to develop WMD. UNSCOM

and IAEA inspectors … And UN controls on Iraq imports have made it more difficult

for Iraq to acquire easily the WMD technology it is seeking.”

789.  Sanctions had “helped make Iraqi acquisition of WMD and the means to deliver

them more difficult” and had “undoubtedly slowed the pace of their reconstitution”. But

there were “always those who are willing to breach sanctions” and “Some equipment”

had “reached Iraq’s WMD programmes”.

790.  Mr Blair was also sent a copy of the Question and Answer briefing to accompany

the dossier.430 Key points of interest included:

• “The dossier shows that Saddam has aggressively pursued his WMD

programme. In the four years since the departure of the inspectors things have

got worse, not better. It would be irresponsible to ignore those facts.”

• Iraq possessed WMD: it was “still hiding weapons of mass destruction in a range

of locations” and it had “admitted producing large quantities of chemical warfare

agents”.

• There was “reliable intelligence” on mobile production facilities for biological

warfare agents which supported “older reporting from defectors”.

• There was “intelligence relating to continued production” of CBW agents.

430  Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Tuesday’s Debate’ attaching Paper

Press Office, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British

Government – Q&A’.

266