The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

725. On 13 March, Mr Hemming wrote to Ms Adams with a draft of the Targeting

Directive and the CDS Directive.261 He wrote that some assumptions “may

need adjustment” in the light of Lord Goldsmith’s advice, and of Ministers’ and

Adm Boyce’s views.

726. Mr Hemming wrote that, in particular, Mr Hoon had “not yet formed a view about

the nature and extent of any delegation in relation to the targeting of key regime

individuals”. He added: “We expect to know his views shortly.”

727. The Targeting Directive attached to Mr Hemming’s letter set out a number of

designated target sets that would not require the application of the UK’s collateral

damage estimation methodology, including a category of “Regime Leadership

Personnel”. That category included Saddam Hussein, Uday Hussein and

Qusay Hussein.

728. Mr Hemming explained the process through which the Targeting Directive

would work:

• Mr Hoon would approve the authorisation proposal.

• Adm Boyce would issue the Directive to Lt Gen Reith.

• Lt Gen Reith would pass authority to AM Burridge and sub-delegate authority

to Air Vice Marshal Glenn Torpy, Air Contingent Commander, for particular

categories of targets.

729. There were nine legal advisers integrated into the clearance process: three at each

level for the relevant commander. Each lawyer had the ability to seek advice from further

up the command chain and each legal office was overseen by the next legal office in

the chain of command.

730. Mr Hemming wrote that the Targeting Directive was kept “under constant review”

and targets authorised by AM Burridge or AVM Torpy would be reported to, and monitored

by the DTIO on a daily basis. The DTIO would report to Adm Boyce and Ministers.

731. Lord Goldsmith emphasised that Mr Hoon would need to satisfy himself that

adequate arrangements were in place to ensure that targets fully complied with

the UK’s obligations under IHL.

732. Lord Goldsmith also asked to receive daily reports on the targets attacked.

733. Ms Adams replied to Mr Hemming on 19 March with Lord Goldsmith’s views in the

light of a further briefing he had received on 17 March.262

261 Letter Hemming to Adams, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq Targeting’ attaching Paper ‘Op TELIC – Targeting

Directive’.

262 Letter Adams to Hemming, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Targeting Directive’.

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