The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
delivery of
measures for the AS90. The level of operational risk would be
determined by
weather
conditions but was “not deemed to be significant”.
368.
The Senior
British Liaison Officer in theatre was examining when
Combat
ID systems
would become available and was in discussions with the US. An
initial
operating capability
for light forces was expected by late February, with a full
operating
capability
“available not later than 18 March”.
369.
On the same
day, Lt Gen Reith received a letter from Sir Robert Walmsley,
the
Chief of
Defence Procurement, about the challenges created by an increase in
the
quantities
of equipment to be delivered by air and sea as a result of the
compressed
timescales
before military action.176
He believed
the DPA could deliver what was required
and that
those capabilities would reach the front line. He
added:
“We
continue to press Industry whom I am confident are doing all that
they can to
achieve
early delivery. Industry is, however, now working to capacity and I
would not
anticipate
any significant improvement in the currently projected delivery
profiles.”
370.
In discussing
AM Stirrup’s update, Lord Bach’s meeting on 10 February noted
that
while the
UK’s NBC capability was judged to be fragile:
“ … all
that could be done to improve NBC protection capabilities was being
done
… The
bottom line was if the Iraqis launched repeated mass attacks,
operational
effectiveness
would be impaired; but we did not believe that they could do
so.”177
371.
The record of
the meeting also stated:
“… it was
noteworthy that a number of deficiencies with which we were
currently
grappling
(Combat ID, DAS [Defensive Aid Suites] for transport aircraft,
equipment
readiness,
desertisation) had been identified in post-GRANBY lessons
learned
reports
…”
On
11 February 2003, Lord Bach requested advice by the end of
that week on whether a
direct link
from theatre for reporting equipment issues should be established,
and how the
The advice
had not been received by 17 February.179
The record
of the meeting stated:
“The
Minister attached real importance to this and would like advice on
what
mechanism
might be devised – presumably through the ECC [Equipment
Capability
Customer]
organisation – for making it happen.”
176
Letter CDP
to CJO, 7 February 2003, ‘Op TELIC UOR Progress’.
177
Minute
PS/Min(DP) to MA/DCDS(EC), 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC –
UORs’.
178
Minute
PS/Min(DP) to MA/DCDS(EC), 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC –
UORs’.
179
Minute
PS/Min (DP) to MA/DCDS(EC), 17 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC
UORs’.
58