4.1 | Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002

212. The draft stated that it was “difficult to assess how close” Iraq was to “restoring

its WMD capability, since the withdrawal of UN inspectors”. The sanctions regime had

“hindered” reconstitution efforts, “although we believe these continue unabated”.103

213. The draft set out descriptions of Iraq’s ballistic missile, nuclear and CBW

capabilities which provided the basis for subsequent drafts.

214. The version sent to No.10 on 6 March is described later in this Section.

215. On behalf of Mr Webb, Mr Paul Schulte, MOD Director, Proliferation and Arms

Control Secretariat, set out a number of concerns about the approach adopted,

including that:

• the countries discussed in the paper were too narrow;

• there was a risk it would undermine the principle of not commenting on

intelligence; and

• it would lead to questions about the action being taken and criticism of

inaction.104

216. Mr Webb suggested that the paper should address “only nuclear and missile

issues in detail” and limit the “concerns over CBW to a more general statement” given

that “In many cases, the arguments … are somewhat thin and unconvincing”.

217. The DIS provided detailed comments from the MOD on the draft paper.105

218. Most of the comments offered by the DIS on Iraq were incorporated in the draft

paper sent to No.10 on 6 March.

219. A DIS document produced on 5 March stated that there was no definitive

intelligence on Iraq’s concepts for the use of WMD.

220. At the request of Air Marshal Joe French, Chief of Defence Intelligence, the DIS

produced a paper on 5 March examining “US military” options for removing Saddam

Hussein over the next 12 months.106

221. The paper is addressed in Section 6.1.

222. Addressing the possibility of Iraq using WMD, the DIS wrote that it had “no

definitive intelligence” on Iraq’s concepts for the use of WMD:

“Iraq did not employ WMD against coalition forces … [in 1991], nor against

the subsequent internal uprisings. We judge that Saddam wished to avoid

103 Letter Hamilton-Eddy to [JIC Proliferation (CIG) members], 28 February 2002, ‘WMD Programmes of

Concern’ attaching Paper Cabinet Office, [undated], ‘WMD Programmes of Concern’.

104 Letter Schulte to Hamilton-Eddy, 4 March 2002, ‘WMD Programmes of Concern’.

105 Letter ADI PS [MOD] to Assessments Staff [junior official], 4 March 2002, ‘DIS Comments on WMD

Programmes of Concern (Unclassified Paper)’.

106 Paper DIS, 5 March 2002, ‘Politico Military Memorandum, Removing Saddam’.

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