3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
•
“nervous
about the concept of requiring interviewees and their families to
leave
Iraq, but
equally recognised the dangers – in terms of undue pressure –
of
letting
families remain in Iraq. He seemed to realise there was little way
round
this, and
said he would say in the Council only that this was a
dilemma.”
•
“was not
keen on London’s suggestion of asking for the list of all
personnel
currently
and formerly associated with Iraq’s WMD programmes … Iraq
had
provided
names and had said they were willing to provide more in
particular
areas on
request”. While it would be “possible to get the interviewees out
of Iraq
in the
timescale we envisaged, it would be difficult to interview them as
well”;
•
“did not
expect anything new to arise” from the test on
anthrax;
•
“was
nervous” that the inclusion of mobile laboratories “made the whole
package
a bit too
heavy for the envisaged 7-10 day timetable” and “thought little
would
come of it
– i.e. Iraq would present legitimate facilities”. He thought that
if the
test was
kept, “it should also refer to chemical facilities and to the sites
that
could
support such mobile facilities”;
•
“preferred
to stick with the language” in Dr Blix’s letter to
Dr Amir al-Sa’adi,
the
Scientific Adviser to the Iraqi Presidency, on missile destruction,
which
he “thought
would cover all Volga engines” and “agreed our inclusion
of
the
destruction of equipment designed for the production and testing of
the
Al Samoud
2”;
•
“wondered
whether the benchmarks would lead to a strategic shift in
Iraq’s
behaviour
though they would certainly ‘burn’ Iraq”;
•
“underlined
that while action in the time period proposed was possible,
there
would need
to be some time afterwards to assess the action taken”;
and
•
“asked a
number of pertinent questions” including: “Who would
judge
compliance?
Would we want to specify whether the information should go
to
UNMOVIC
and/or the Council? What would we do if Iraq gave straight
denials?”
255.
Sir Jeremy had
discussed the draft with Mr Inocencio Arias, the
Spanish
Permanent
Representative to the UN, who made “few comments”, and
Ambassador
John
Negroponte, US Permanent Representative to the UN, who was “very
concerned
that the
statement should not be part of the resolution”. Another US
official had
commented
that Washington was “intensively discussing the benchmarks ideas,
but
he had
heard no one in State or the NSC who favoured them”, thought that
“it would
be
relatively easy for the Iraqis to satisfy the tests”, and they
“would not lead to the
US feeling
any safer”.
256.
Sir Jeremy had
also briefed Ambassador Negroponte “in general terms”
on
possible
fallback options. Ambassador Negroponte thought the side statement
“would
not go
anywhere. Mexico and Chile were asking for a lot more then we had
in mind,
443