The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
addresses analysis and findings in relation to the evidence set out
in
Section
13.1, on the allocation of resources for military operations and
civilian activities
in
Iraq.
2.
This Section
does not address how government departments used the
resources
available
to them. Specifically:
•
the
provision of military equipment is considered in Sections 6.3 and
14;
•
the UK’s
support for reconstruction is considered in Section 10;
and
•
the UK’s
support for Security Sector Reform is considered in Section
12.
•
The direct
cost of the conflict in Iraq was at least £9.2bn (the equivalent
of
£11.83bn in
2016). In total, 89 percent of that was spent on military
operations.
•
The
Government’s decision to take part in military action against Iraq
was not
affected by
consideration of the potential financial cost to the UK of the
invasion or
the
post‑conflict period.
•
Ministers were
not provided with estimates of military conflict and post‑conflict
costs,
or with
advice on their affordability, when decisions were taken on the
scale of the
UK’s
military contribution to a US‑led invasion of Iraq, and on the UK’s
role in the
post‑conflict
period. They should have been.
•
There was no
articulated need for additional financial resources for
military
operations
in Iraq that was not met.
•
The
arrangements for funding military Urgent Operational Requirements
(UORs) and
other
military costs worked as intended, and did not constrain the UK
military’s ability
to conduct
operations in Iraq.
•
The controls
imposed by the Treasury on the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD’s)
budget
in
September 2003 did not constrain the UK military’s ability to
conduct operations
in Iraq.
•
The Government
was slow to recognise that Iraq was an enduring operation,
and
to adapt
its funding arrangements to support both military operations and
civilian
activities.
•
The
arrangements for securing funding for civilian activities could be
slow and
unpredictable.
Some high‑priority civilian activities were funded late or only in
part.
3.
It was the
responsibility of departments in the first instance
to:
•
produce
estimates of the costs of activities for which they were
responsible;
•
discuss
those estimates with the Treasury; and
•
make them
available to Ministers and, if appropriate, Cabinet to inform
their
discussions.
570