The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
147.
In a meeting
with Ambassador Bremer and Mr Sawers on 16 May, some of
the
Iraqi
leaders present argued that the scope of the recently announced
de‑Ba’athification
policy
should be “broadened to include the security services and army,
private
companies
set up under Saddam, and the media”.115
Bremer
promised that there would
be a
further proclamation on the security services and army in the days
ahead.
148.
On 23 May, CPA
Order No.2 – “Dissolution of Entities” – “dissolved” (or
disbanded)
a number of
military and other security entities that had operated as part of
Saddam
Hussein’s
regime.116
The
dissolved entities included:
•
the
government ministries responsible for Defence, Information and
Military
Affairs;
•
the
intelligence agencies;
•
the armed
forces; and
•
the
paramilitary forces which were closely associated with Saddam
Hussein.
149.
CPA Order No.2
also stated that:
•
military
ranks were cancelled;
•
conscripts
were released;
•
a
termination payment would be paid to those dismissed, except to
senior party
members;
and
•
pensions
would continue to be paid, except to senior party
members.
150.
Neither the
IPS nor the MOI were dissolved. Reflecting on the Order several
years
later,
Ambassador Bremer wrote in the New York
Times that the
“police force, which we
did recall
to duty, has proven unreliable and is mistrusted by the very Iraqi
people it is
151.
In his
book State of
Denial, Mr Bob
Woodward suggested that an early draft of the
Order had
proposed disbanding the MOI.118
At Lt
Gen Garner’s suggestion, that had not
been
implemented, in order to preserve the IPS who were employed by the
MOI.
152.
Existing
members of the organisations listed above were dismissed from
their
former
employment, with effect from 16 April (the date of Gen Franks’
declaration).119
153.
Order No.2
also announced:
“The CPA
plans to create in the near future a New Iraqi
Corps,120
as the
first step
in forming
a national self‑defense capability for a free Iraq. Under civilian
control,
115
Telegram 13
IraqRep to FCO London, 17 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Bremer Meets Leadership
Group’.
116
Coalition
Provisional Authority Order Number 2, 23 May 2003, Section
1.
117
New York
Times, 6
September 2007, How I
didn’t dismantle Iraq’s army.
118
Woodward
B. State of
Denial. Simon &
Schuster UK Ltd, 2006.
119
Coalition
Provisional Authority Order Number 2, 23 May 2003, Section
3(1)‑(3).
120
The New
Iraqi Corps later became the New Iraqi Army.
94