8 | The
invasion
further
into the city. We hoped that, in due course, people in Basra would
conclude
that we
really meant to liberate them, and would come over to
us.”
325.
Dr Rice said
that “the Fedayeen phenomenon” had been underestimated, but
that
Gen Franks
was quickly adjusting his tactics in response.
326.
In briefing
for a discussion between Mr Blair and President Bush at
lunchtime on
31 March,
Mr Matthew Rycroft, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, advised
that, in
relation to the military campaign:
“You said
you wanted to cover … consequences of an incremental
approach.
Including
in the media campaign. Need for strategic grip.” 181
327.
The discussion
between Mr Blair and President Bush recognised that
the
advance on
Baghdad had slowed to give the air campaign more time to “soften
up”
the
Republican Guard.182
Mr Blair
was concerned that the “Basra scenario” could be
repeated in
Baghdad with a small, pro-regime force in a large built-up area
which was
“difficult
for us to get at without risk of high civilian casualties”. In such
circumstances,
Mr Blair
stated that winning the “propaganda war” would be even more
important.
Persistent
attacks on pro-regime forces coupled with efforts to “win over the
locals”
would
eventually reach a tipping point, but that could take weeks to
develop. There was
a need to
tighten up media handling and drive the news agenda. Mr Blair
suggested
that, as
for the Kosovo campaign, the US and UK “needed an election-style
media
‘war-room’”.
During the “steady advance” phase, propaganda and politics would
be
inextricably
linked. A clearer picture was needed of the shape of a post-Saddam
Hussein
Iraq to
“sketch out a political and economic future and dispel the myth
that we were out
to grab
Iraq’s oil. But our promises had to be realistic”.
328.
Following the
discussion, Mr Blair sent President Bush two
Notes.
329.
Reflecting
Mr Blair’s concerns about communications, one Note set out
his
proposals
for a media and communications “War Room” on both sides of the
Atlantic
to provide
a “real sense of strategic grip”.183
It would
contain eight units able to:
•
generate a
“big picture message” each day and discourage ad hoc
interviews;
•
rebut
negative stories;
•
work up
stories which showed the nature of the regime, including trying to
free
up more
intelligence material;
•
obtain
coverage of Iraqi people helping the Coalition and step up efforts
to get
messages
into Iraq;
•
explain
what life had been like in Basra pre-invasion and what was being
done
to improve
the situation;
181
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 31 March 2003, ‘Bush Call:
Checklist’.
182
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 31 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
conversation with Bush, 31 March’.
183
Letter
Manning to Rice, 31 March 2003, [untitled].
55