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13.1  |  Resources
as a finance ministry, to ensure an appropriate level of funding was provided to
achieve the UK’s objectives in Iraq and that it was used cost‑effectively.17
This Section describes the Treasury’s involvement on Iraq in relation to both those roles.
The Treasury’s involvement in planning for and supporting Iraq’s post‑conflict economic
reconstruction is described in Sections 6.4, 6.5 and 10.
The version of the Ministerial Code that was current in 2003 stated that the cost of a
proposal should be calculated and discussed with the Treasury before that proposal was
submitted for discussion at Cabinet level:
“It is the responsibility of the initiating department to ensure that proposals have
been discussed with other departments and the results of these discussions reflected
in the memorandum submitted to Cabinet or a Ministerial Committee. Proposals
involving expenditure or affecting general financial policy should be discussed with
the Treasury before being submitted to the Cabinet or a Ministerial Committee.
The result of the discussion together with an estimate of the cost to the Exchequer
(or estimates, including the Treasury’s estimate, if the department and the Treasury
disagree) should be included, along with an indication of how the cost would be met
(e.g. by offsetting savings). The estimate of the cost should identify any impact on
other departments.”18
20.  Sir Nicholas Macpherson told the Inquiry that departmental settlements were the
main source of funding for FCO activity in Iraq, including the UK’s diplomatic presence in
Baghdad and Basra, and for DFID’s contribution to the humanitarian and reconstruction
effort.19 Before the invasion, the Treasury worked with departments to produce estimates
of the potential cost of intervention and to ensure that, where appropriate, sufficient
funding had been set aside within their existing budgets.
21.  If departments were unable to fund activities from their departmental settlements,
they could bid to the Treasury for additional funding from the Reserve.
22.  The table below shows the departmental settlements for the MOD, the FCO and
DFID from 2002/03 to 2009/10 (under the 2002, 2004 and 2007 Comprehensive
Spending Reviews).20
17 Statement, 15 January 2010, page 1.
18 Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code, 2001.
19 Statement, 15 January 2010, page 1.
20 Email Treasury [junior official] to Iraq Inquiry [junior official], 17 April 2014, ‘Further Queries Relating to
Resources’. Figures are near cash settlements, in real terms (2008/09 prices). Figures may differ from
Comprehensive Spending Review settlement letters due to budget exchange, inter‑departmental transfers
and other factors.
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