The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1260.
Discussion of
the two documents and the emergence of the UK AOR in
southern
Iraq are
addressed in Section 8.
1261.
In advance of
the meeting between Mr Blair and President Bush at Camp
David
on 26 and
27 March, Mr Straw’s Private Office sent Mr Rycroft a
negotiating brief for
what was to
become resolution 1483, the resolution defining the roles of the UN
and the
Coalition
in post-conflict Iraq.531
1262.
The
negotiating brief, prepared by the IPU, described what was known
about the
“first few
weeks” after the combat phases of the military
campaign:
“Immediately
after the conflict, the Coalition will be in control of
Iraq.
“As soon as
it is safe to do so, Jay Garner and his Office of Reconstruction
and
Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA) will arrive behind the military and become
a
transitional
administration. Their aim will be to work with the existing Iraqi
public
administration,
so far as possible. Garner will then take forward the
reconstruction
process.
His people will be inserted into the top of the Iraqi ministries,
with senior
US officials
being assigned to each ministry as ‘shadow ministers’
…
“ORHA is
understaffed and began preparing for its task only a few weeks ago.
There
are now
some ten or so UK secondees embedded in it. Garner would like to be
out
of Iraq
within 90-120 days. Whether ORHA will be able to get any reform
programme
started in
that time is moot. This period is likely to be dominated by
humanitarian
and
security concerns.”
1263.
The IPU
advised that ORHA and the Coalition might enjoy a “brief
honeymoon”,
but not if
the Coalition seemed set on administering Iraq for more than a
brief period.
It was
therefore necessary to put in place interim arrangements for
post-conflict
administration
that would be accepted by the Iraqi people and the Arab and
Islamic
world.
1264.
A resolution
was required to authorise those interim arrangements, and to
provide
a legal
basis for “reconstruction and reform”:
“Without a
UNSCR, other countries, international organisations, the IFIs,
UN
agencies
and NGOs will be comparatively limited in what they can do … That
would
leave US/UK
with no viable exit strategy from Iraq and a huge
bill.”
531
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 25 March 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s visit to Washington:
Iraq: UN Security Council
Resolution
on Phase IV’ attaching Paper Iraq Planning Unit, 25 March 2003,
‘Iraq: Phase IV: Authorising
UNSCR’.
534