The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
and
actively with the inspectors” had to be “dealt
with”.344
The first
question for the
Council
was, “has Iraq taken this final opportunity”? His answer was that,
as no-one
had said
Iraq was “now fully, actively and immediately in compliance”, it
had “not so far
taken this
final opportunity”.
1130.
Dr Blix’s
“clusters” document to the Council was a “chilling” account of
Iraq’s
non-compliance
over 12 years and there had “not been active co-operation in the
areas
which
matter”. The examples cited by Mr Straw included:
•
Iraq had
“dragged its feet on as many elements of procedural and
substantive
co-operation
as possible”.
•
Iraq was
still refusing to pass a law prohibiting State authorities from
engaging
on work
relating to weapons of mass destruction.
•
Iraq had
“done everything possible to prevent unrestricted,
unrecorded
interviews”.
Of the 3,500 people on UNSCOM’s lists, “just twelve
private
interviews
had been allowed”, and “all of those … were threatened
and
intimidated
beforehand”. He understood that “the scientists most likely to
have
the most
incriminating evidence have been locked away”. There had been
no
interviews
outside Iraq. Mr Straw stated: “The restrictions placed on
[these]
interviews
is itself the most incriminating evidence that Saddam has
something
to
hide.”
•
Under-reporting
of the import of Al Samoud 2 missile engines and the
missile’s
range were
examples of Iraq’s “calculation that it can satisfy the Council
with
a partial
response”.
1131.
Addressing the
memorandum produced by France, Germany and Russia,
Mr Straw
stated that “it defies experience to believe that continuing
inspections
with no
firm end date” would achieve complete disarmament “if Iraq’s full
and active
co-operation”
was not “immediately forthcoming”. The memorandum was
“not
even a
formula for containment, given Iraq’s proven ability to develop
weapons
of mass destruction”.
1132.
Mr Straw
welcomed the progress the inspectors had reported. His “earnest
wish”,
and that of
the UK Government, was to achieve Iraq’s disarmament, “if possible
by
peaceful
means”. But it was necessary to recognise that “the progress that
has been
reported
represents only the tip of a very large iceberg of huge unfinished
business
required of
Iraq”. He also welcomed the diplomatic pressure on Iraq but
suggested it
was the
presence of US and UK troops in the region which had influenced the
recent
increase in
Iraq’s co-operation.
1133.
Addressing
Mr de Villepin’s statement that “the choice before us
was
disarmament
by peace or disarmament by war”, Mr Straw pointed out that
that was
344
UN Security
Council, ‘4714th Meeting Friday 7 March 2003’
(S/PV.4714).
384