3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
359.
On 3 October,
the FCO provided a revised text incorporating the amended
OP10
and other
changes to reflect discussions between the P5.122
The
covering letter explicitly
stated:
“In our
view, a text along these lines would require a further Security
Council
resolution
to authorise the use of force.”
360.
The FCO also
stated:
“There
would, of course, be … argument about the extent to which any
Iraqi
transgression
constituted a flagrant violation. It would therefore be important
to
obtain a
clear commitment from the French and Russians in advance.
This could
either
be through a side agreement with them containing an indication
of the
circumstances
in which we would want to seek authorisation on the lines
described
in the
paper enclosed with my letter … of 2 October. It could also be
useful to agree
on a
contingency basis among the P5 the text of a second
resolution.”
361.
Sir David
Manning discussed the draft resolution with Dr Rice on 3
October,
pointing
out that it “did not rule out military action if there were no
further Security
Council
resolution ie it did not pre‑empt the ‘Kosovo option’ … President
Bush had yet
to take
a view on it.”123
362.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Sir David Manning was concerned that Saddam
Hussein
was
“probably going to make positive noises about inspections and try
to drag things
to February
because then the ‘window of war’ would close”.124
363.
Mr Ricketts
advised that failure to obtain a second resolution was
likely
to leave
the UK with “no plausible legal basis” for the use of force; the
“Kosovo
option”
would be no help.
364.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that there was “no parallel” between
the
circumstances
of military action in Iraq and in Kosovo.
365.
In a minute on
3 October to Mr Straw’s Private Office, which was sent to Sir
David
Manning and
Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Mr Ricketts set out his views, “As a
mind clearing
exercise”,
on whether: “If the Security Council adopts a resolution with our
new version
of OP10 …
we have conceded the principle that a second resolution is
required.”125
He
added: “If
we do not for some reason get it, it must be very likely that the
Attorney would
conclude
that [the UK] did not have a legal basis for military
action.”
366.
Mr Ricketts
did “not think the ‘Kosovo option’ helps in these circumstances”.
The
UK had not
relied on or sought a resolution authorising the use of force; it
had relied on
122
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 3 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UNSC
Resolution’.
123
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 3 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
124
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
125
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 3 October 2002, ‘Iraq:
Resolutions: The “Kosovo Option”’.
263