5 | Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003

869. Mr Straw added:

“… we were being publicly bombarded with the arguments, and arguments about the

consequences. We received detailed legal advice, for example, from CND saying

why it was unlawful and what the personal consequences would be.

“So everybody understood what the issues were and the level of responsibility,

personal and individual …”389

870. Mr Straw also stated that Cabinet “was more involved in this decision” because

members of Cabinet had to “explain themselves in the House of Commons as well as

publicly and to their constituency parties”.

871. Asked if he was fully satisfied with the advice that was given to Cabinet about the

legality of the conflict, Mr Brown told the Inquiry that Lord Goldsmith’s role was to give

Cabinet advice, and that “he was certain about the advice he gave” but it was Cabinet’s

job to “make our decisions on the basis, not simply of the legal advice, but the moral,

political and other case for taking action”.390

872. Asked if he had been aware that Lord Goldsmith had earlier taken a different

view, Mr Brown replied that he was not aware of the details and that he had not been

involved in previous discussions with Lord Goldsmith. Mr Brown added:

“We had this straightforward issue. We were sitting down as a Cabinet, to discuss

the merits of taking action once the diplomatic avenues had been exhausted,

unfortunately, and we had to have straightforward advice from the Attorney General:

was it lawful or was it not? His advice in the Cabinet meeting was unequivocal.”391

873. Asked if he had seen Lord Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March, Mr Brown replied:

“As I understand it, the constitutional position is very clear, that before a decision

of such magnitude is made, the Attorney General has to say whether he thinks it is

lawful or not. That was the straightforward question that we had to answer. If he had

answered equivocally … then of course there would have been questions, but he

was very straightforward in his recommendation.

“To me, that was a necessary part of the discussion about the decision of war, but it

wasn’t sufficient, because we had to look at the political and other case that had to

be examined in the light of the period of diplomacy at the United Nations.”392

389 Public hearing, 8 February 2010, page 66.

390 Public hearing, 5 March 2010, page 50.

391 Public hearing, 5 March 2010, page 51.

392 Public hearing, 5 March 2010, pages 51-52.

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