3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
was some
expressions of concern about the developing resolution, draft
resolution,
though, as
I have said it actually changed in significant ways at the last
moment.”
981.
Lord Goldsmith
subsequently wrote that in his oral evidence he had had in
mind
the passage
in Mr Brummell’s letter recording that he could not give a
final view on the
effect of
the resolution until it had been adopted.360
982.
Asked about
Mr Brummell’s letter to Sir David Manning of 23 October,
Lord
Goldsmith
wrote that he “felt there should be a record of the advice” he had
offered; that
he had
asked Mr Brummell to send the letter; and that, if he had not
recorded his advice
through
that means, he “would have ensured that the same result was
achieved by other
means, i.e.
through written advice in a note to No.10”.361
983.
Lord
Goldsmith’s argument that he could not give a ‘final view’ on the
legal
effect of
resolution 1441 until after its adoption is evidently
correct.
984.
Lord
Goldsmith was also being advised that he should not
“provide
a running
commentary”.
985.
Nevertheless,
and given its importance, Mr Blair and Mr Straw should
have
ensured
that Lord Goldsmith was invited to advise on the legal implications
of the
text under
discussion at key stages in the development of resolution
1441.
986.
That would
have ensured that policy decisions were fully informed
by
consideration
of the legal issues.
987.
Specifically
Lord Goldsmith’s views should, at the very least, have
been
sought and
considered first in the context of the decision on 17 October that
the
UK should
seek to negotiate a resolution which would be capable of
authorising
the use of
force without a further decision by the Security Council, and
secondly
once the
near final draft of the resolution was available on 4 November and
before
the
resolution was adopted on 8 November.
988.
There
should have been an agreed, collective understanding of the
legal
effect of
the resolution amongst key Ministers, the Cabinet Secretary, the
Chief
of the
Defence Staff and senior officials participating in the
negotiations.
989.
As Ms Adams
pointed out, the UK Government “didn’t really know
what
it was
voting for”.
990.
Ms Adams had
told the Inquiry that the timing of the legal advice
was:
“… a very
important issue … and in fact for me this is the key lesson learned
from
the whole
episode … I say this with the benefit of hindsight – I do think
that if
definitive
advice had been given, and perhaps it might have had to be
conditional
360
Statement,
4 January 2011, paragraph 3.8.
361
Statement,
4 January 2011, paragraphs 3.3 and 3.5.
373