The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
UNMOVIC/IAEA
or in any other way required of them under the terms
of relevant
resolutions or under terms set out by UNMOVIC/IAEA …
•
failure to
meet the deadlines set out in the relevant
resolutions.”
308.
Sir David
Manning told Mr Blair that the “main issue” for his
conversation with
President
Bush was the provision for the use of “all necessary means” if
Saddam
Hussein was
found to be in breach of his obligations.104
That
“automaticity” went “too
far” for
France and Russia. President Bush would “ideally like to dispense”
with the draft
OP10, but
accepted that was “a political impossibility”. The UK wanted
“something like
OP10 to
give us legal cover if at some stage we take military
action”.
309.
Sir David
added that the FCO letter “identified various possible fixes”, and
he
recommended
that Mr Blair should persuade President Bush “to go the two
resolution
route
(you warned
that this might well be necessary at last month’s Camp
David
meeting)”.
310.
Sir David
proposed language in OP10 that stipulated “in the event of a
breach, the
Council
will decide to authorise all necessary means”. That conceded the
issue would
“have to
come back to the Security Council for further decision, so saving
Chirac’s face”.
311.
Sir David
advised that, “at the same time”, the US and UK “should insist
on
privately
pre‑negotiating the terms of a second, follow‑up resolution [with
France and
Russia]
that would authorise ‘all necessary means’ once a breach is
established”; and
that the
current draft should not be revised until that had been agreed.
That would:
“… not be
without difficulties:
– bringing
the French and Russians to pre‑negotiate a tough second
resolution
and commit
themselves to it;
–
establishing clearly what would constitute a breach and so trigger
action: this
will need
to be pinned down in advance.
“But there
is a chance a deal of this kind can be struck … The French and
Russians
may well be
reluctant: but if this is the price to avoid early US unilateralist
action with
serious
long term damage to the Security Council, they may well
pay.”
312.
Sir David
concluded that if Mr Blair and President Bush could agree, “we
can
get on
with the business of trying to sell it in capitals and the UN. We
now need to
move fast.”
313.
In a second
conversation on 2 October, Mr Straw was informed that
President
Bush was
“very energised” about a single resolution.105
104
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 2 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Your Phonecall
Today with Bush’.
105
Letter
Straw to Manning, 2 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversations with Colin
Powell’.
256