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8  |  The invasion
707.  Overnight on 1/2 May, the UK military AO was adjusted to be coterminous with the
boundaries of Basra and Maysan provinces.398
708.  On 2 May, Mr Rycroft gave Mr Blair a set of papers on the UK contribution to
ORHA (see Section 10.1).399 None addressed the issue of coterminous boundaries for
the UK military AOR and ORHA’s southern region.
709.  The Inquiry has seen no indication that Mr Blair subsequently raised the issue.
710.  During May, ORHA was subsumed into the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
(see Sections 9.1 and 10.1).
711.  Resolution 1483 confirming the UN’s role in post-conflict Iraq was adopted
on 22 May.
712.  On 14 June, Ministers “noted” that it had been decided that the UK AO would
expand to four provinces at the end of July and that substantial Italian and Dutch
military forces were expected to have deployed to the South by mid-July.
713.  The Inquiry has seen no indication of when the decision on the expansion
of the UK AO had been taken or by whom.
714.  United Nations Security Council resolution 1483 (2003) was adopted on 22 May.400
715.  The resolution, described in more detail in Section 9.1, confirmed that there
would be a role for the UN, exercised through a Special Representative to the
Secretary‑General, but made it clear that the UN would not have the lead responsibility
for the administration and reconstruction of Iraq, which would fall to the CPA. The
resolution also called for help in the reform, rebuilding, stabilisation and security of Iraq,
including from international financial institutions.
716.  An internal PJHQ briefing on 12 June reported that there was “a trend of
intelligence reporting from the UK AOR showing increasing dissatisfaction of the civil
populace”.401 The briefing attributed the deterioration in the relationship between UK
forces and the local population to a lack of food, failure to ensure essential services
“such as water, electricity and security”, a general increase in anti-Coalition rhetoric from
Shia clerics, a lack of accurate information/news reporting and a lack of progress in the
political process.
398  Letter Burridge to CJO, 8 May 2003, ‘NCC Op TELIC Hauldown Report’.
399  Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 2 May 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA’.
400  UN Press Release, 22 May 2003, Security Council lifts sanctions on Iraq, approves UN role, calls
for appointment of Secretary-General’s Special Representative (SC/7765).
401  Minute DACOS J3(Ops Sp) and DACOS J2(Int) to MA/DCJO(Ops), 12 June 2003, ‘Relations with
the Basrah Population’.
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