The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
413.
Mr Howard
described the main risks and obstacles facing the ISG:
•
the
security situation (addressed in more detail in the Box,
‘Deteriorating
Security
and the ISG’, later in this Section);
•
an
“insufficiently flexible detention policy”, which was being
exploited by former
regime
figures to discourage people from co-operating; and
•
the “lack
of an immunity component to the incentives package”.
414.
Mr Scarlett
reported Mr Howard’s conclusions to Sir David Manning together
with
an outline
of the draft JIC Assessment of Iraq’s prohibited missile
systems.212
415.
Mr Scarlett
advised Sir David that evidence on Iraq’s missile, nuclear and
BW
programmes
gathered so far demonstrated “a clear policy of concealment”,
including
“physical
and oral deception”.
416.
Mr Scarlett’s
minute was seen by Mr Blair.213
417.
Asked how the
absence of evidence of WMD in Iraq was presented to
Mr Blair,
Sir John
Scarlett told the Inquiry:
“The advice
from the Cabinet Office and from the Assessments Staff and the
JIC
was
straight down the middle. He [Mr Blair] was told what was
being found and what
was not
being found, and he was given the best advice about the
significance of
what was
being found and not being found … [T]here was nothing in the advice
that
went from
me or from the JIC … [to indicate] that anyone was raising
expectations
that
weren’t justified.”214
418.
In
Washington on 17 July, Mr Blair told the media that he
believed “with every
fibre of
instinct and conviction” that he was right about the threat from
Iraqi WMD,
but that it
was important to wait for the ISG to complete its
work.
419.
On
17 July, Mr Blair visited Washington to deliver a speech
to a joint meeting of
Congress,
which had awarded him the Congressional Gold Medal. He also met
the
Congressional
leadership and, separately, President Bush (see
Section 9.2).215
420.
Before the
visit, the British Embassy Washington reported that the debate on
Iraqi
WMD in the
US remained “febrile”.216
In the face
of an offensive on the issue by the
Democratic
Party and in the media, mutual distrust between the White House and
the
CIA was
palpable. All the Democrat presidential candidates were raising
questions about
US
intelligence, while other leading Democrats stepped up calls for a
full Congressional
investigation
or an independent inquiry. Congressional Republicans were holding
the line
212
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 16 July 2003, ‘Iraq WMD: Update from the
ISG’.
213
Manuscript
comment Manning, 17 July 2003, on Minute Scarlett to Manning,
16 July 2003, ‘Iraq WMD:
Update from
the ISG’.
214
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, page 62.
215
Letter
[Private Secretary] to Adams, 18 July 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s
Visit to Washington, 17 July’.
216
Telegram
957 Washington to FCO London, 17 July 2003, ‘Iraq WMD: Update,
16 July’.
506