6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

1180. Lt Gen Reith stated that it “would bring considerable strategic exposure for the

UK at the earliest stage of the campaign”. It “was consistent with UK objectives” and

provided “valuable strategic, operational and presentational effect”.

1181. Lt Gen Reith advised that US ground operations against Iraq in the South were

“now planned to commence simultaneously with the air campaign” and the US intention

was to establish a second Sea Point of Disembarkation at Umm Qasr. This was

“essential” to allow the rapid build‑up of forces. The US plan entailed securing the “oil

nodes”, the capture of Umm Qasr and the al‑Faw peninsula, and clearance of mines in

the Khawr Abd Allah (KAA) waterway.

1182. The plan had been developed with UK input, was “well advanced”, and was

“heavily reliant” on the UK to achieve its aims. The ATG “would be based around”

40 Commando Group and the plan envisaged a two company helicopter‑borne

amphibious assault capability. The ATG’s landing craft would “provide flexibility” a

“simultaneous … surface assault”, but it was “more likely to be used for logistic support”.

1183. On 11 December, Maj Gen Fry advised the Chiefs of Staff that:

“The operation had important economic and environmental strands as well as

being militarily essential. UK participation would enable the operation to complete

10 days sooner than if the US went alone and would ensure UK participation in land

operations at P+ a few days, well ahead of the Main Effort in the North at P+60 …

For the operation to go forward, the areas of risk that needed to be managed were

SH [support helicopters] and Medical … The SH risk was not to be underestimated,

but should be managed by sequencing … Until the TU [Turkey] question was

resolved, an operation in the North was a complete uncertainty and, by accepting

risk on SH, the ATG task would ensure UK land participation.”464

1184. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that committing the ATG would ensure the UK’s

participation in operations, although there would be risks if support helicopters were

needed for operations in both the North and South.

1185. Adm Boyce directed that a submission to Mr Hoon should be prepared

“summarising CJO’s paper in accordance with his instructions”.

1186. Mr Hoon’s agreement to planning for a discrete British role in securing

a bridgehead in the initial stages of a military campaign was sought on

11 December.

1187. Adm Boyce briefed Mr Hoon on the planning for deployment of the ATG and

development of a discrete British role in seizing a bridgehead.465

464 Minutes, 11 December 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

465 Minute Bowen to Manning, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq: CDS Briefing of Mr Hoon’.

353