9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
289.
On 6 May, Mr
Michael Wood, FCO Legal Adviser, wrote to Mr Chilcott arguing
that
the Freedom
Message appeared to create the CPA to exercise powers of
government,
but the UK
had no idea what the CPA comprised and what its legislative,
executive and
judicial
authority was.179
290.
Mr Wood was
unclear what the CPA was: “Is it ORHA? Is it a combination of
ORHA
and General
Franks? Where does the future Iraqi Interim Authority
fit?”
291.
Mr Wood
identified a number of examples within the Freedom Message and
the
accompanying
instructions to the Iraqi people that raised issues under
international
humanitarian
law.
292.
Mr Wood also
highlighted that analysis of the Freedom Message suggested
that
armed
conflict in Iraq had ended and therefore that prisoners of war
should be released.
This
appeared to contrast with another section of the Message, which
said prisoners
should be
held pending CPA orders. Mr Wood wrote:
“This means
that it is possible that, within the UK’s area of control,
prisoners whose
prison
sentence comes to an end may be held beyond the lawful date of
their
release.
This would almost certainly be contrary to Article 5
ECHR.”
293.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Sir Michael Wood explained:
“FCO legal
advisers were concerned to avoid the UK being held jointly
responsible
for acts or
omissions of the CPA, without a right to consult and a right of
joint
decision. A
particular concern was if those acts went beyond the powers of
an
Occupying
Power under the general law of Occupation or under the SCRs …
The
aim was to
have matters such as the territorial extent of the UK’s Occupation
rights
and
responsibilities, the extent of its potential responsibility for
acts and omissions of
the CPA,
and the UK’s role within the CPA (especially joint decision-making)
set out
in a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
Americans.”180
294.
The next US
draft of the post-conflict resolution was sent to Mr Rycroft and
Sir
David
Manning on 6 May.181
295.
Text on the
UN’s role in establishing the IIA and on oil sales remained
unchanged;
the
extension of the OFF programme had been increased by a month, to a
total of four
months.
296.
Mr Straw
chaired a video conference with Dr Rice, Secretary Powell, Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock
and others to discuss the draft.182
179
Minute Wood
to Chilcott, 6 May 2003, ‘Iraq: The McKiernan and Franks
Proclamations’.
180
Statement
Wood, 15 March 2011, page 22.
181
Minute
Bellinger to Rycroft and Manning, 6 May 2003, ‘Revised Draft:
UNSCR’ attaching ‘Resolution
on Post-Conflict
Iraq’.
182
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 6 May 2003, ‘Iraq/UN: Video-Conference with
Condi Rice and
Colin Powell,
6 May’.
181