6.3 | Military equipment (pre-conflict)

143. Mr Watkins stated “it would take six months for the whole division to be in place

and then with limited sustainment and reach”.

144. Mr Watkins cautioned that:

“… the timescales indicated are the best planning estimates we can make at

this stage … they assume that, as soon as a decision in principle is reached to

participate, funding will be available to improve sustainability … and implement

urgent operational requirements … The ability of industry to respond to our demands

can only be estimated at this stage.”

145. Mr Hoon had:

“… commissioned more work in respect of sustainability and UORs with a view to

expediting what would need to be done once a decision in principle was taken, with

what visibility to the public eye and with what cost … It will involve widening the net

of knowledge about this contingency planning within the MOD, although we will not

yet contact industry who will have to be involved at some stage to determine actual

lead times for procurement of UORs.”

146. The advice was sent to Mr Blair on 31 July, as one of several “background papers”

he had commissioned at his meeting on 23 July “for summer reading”.68

147. Mr Rycroft commented to Mr Blair:

“The military are not yet ready to make a recommendation on which if any of the

three options to go for. Nor can they yet judge whether the US have a winning

concept. They are continuing to work with the US military. You do not need to take

decisions yet.”

148. The MOD advised Mr Hoon on 30 July that there was a shortfall in “essential”

equipment enhancements for all three packages in respect of protection against

an Iraqi biological attack. It had “low confidence” that those shortfalls could be

addressed within six months.

149. The MOD sought approval to engage more widely to refine its work on lead

times but Mr Hoon decided that would be premature.

150. On 30 July, an MOD official provided Mr Hoon with a “best estimate” of the

equipment enhancements that might be necessary in order to deliver the potential UK

force packages.69

151. In an attached annex, the enhancements had been categorised as either “essential

now”, “full operational capability enhancers”, or “follow-on enhancements”.

68 Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Background Papers’.

69 Minute Sec(O)1a to PS/SofS [MOD], 30 July 2002, ‘Iraq – Enhancements Required For Potential

UK Contribution’.

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