The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“On the
basis of the evidence so far of the programme’s progress before
Desert
Storm, Iraq
could have made its first nuclear weapon by 1993, had its work not
been
interrupted
by the war.”62
156.
That was two
years earlier than had been assessed before the 1990-1991
conflict.
The
unexpected discoveries had a significant impact on subsequent JIC
Assessments,
which
tended to look at Iraq’s potential capability on a “worst case”
basis.
157.
By the end of
1992, the processes of transporting Iraq’s fissionable material
to
Russia and
of the IAEA supervising the destruction of many large installations
that had
been used
in Iraq’s weapons programme was mostly complete.63
158.
Iraq’s actions
to conceal the scale and details of its activity, including the
unilateral
destruction
of prohibited weapons and material, created major problems for
UNSCOM in
carrying
out its mandate.
159.
The regime for
“ongoing monitoring and verification” (OMV) was authorised
in
resolution
715 (1991), adopted by the Security Council on 11 October
1991.64
160.
Mr Ekéus
wrote that “the monitoring system could not be fully operational
until
early 1995
due to Iraqi’s obstructions”.65
161.
In January
1992, the JIC significantly revised its assessment of Iraq’s
remaining
ballistic
missile holdings, stating:
•
“Although
we do not know the true figure, we assess that around 100
SCUD-B
remain
concealed.”
•
There might
be “as many as 250 complete Soviet build SCUD-B
guidance
and engine
packages which cannot be accounted for, and would be critical
for
future
production. Provided the raw material was available, Iraq could
build
its own
replacement mid-body sections and assemble new material from
this
162.
Iraq told
UNSCOM, after 1999, that it produced 17 Al Abbas and 387 Al
Hussein
missiles
between 1987 and 1990.67
62
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
44.
63
Blix
H. Disarming
Iraq.
Bloomsbury, 2004.
64
UN Security
Council resolution 715 (1991).
65
Statement
Ekéus, 23 April 2011.
66
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
pages
50-51.
67
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
pages
49-50.
52