3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
threat will be
heightened by military action against Iraq. The
broader threat from
Islamist
terrorists will also increase in the event of war, reflecting
intensified anti-US/
anti-Western
sentiment in the Muslim world, including among Muslim
communities
in the
West. And there is a risk that the transfer of CB material or
expertise, during
or in
the aftermath of conflict, will enhance Al Qaida’s
capabilities.”
182.
On 11
February, Usama Bin Laden issued a call for Muslims everywhere to
take
up arms in
defence of Iraq.47
That was
followed on 16 February by a call for “compulsory
jihad” by
Muslims against the West.
183.
A Security
Service report in February 2003 concluded:
“Iraq is
unlikely to use terrorism to attack the worldwide interests of the
US and
its allies
prior to military action.”48
184.
A further
JIC Assessment on 19 February predicted that the upward
trend
in the
reports of threats to the UK was likely to continue.
185.
On 19
February, the JIC updated the December 2002 Assessment of
the
continuing
threat posed by Al Qaida and associated extremists, including to
the UK.49
186.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements were that:
“•
A high
impact, spectacular, attack is a priority for Al Qaida, most likely
against
American or
British interests in the Gulf, US or UK. Al Qaida will also seek
to
conduct
frequent, perhaps multiple, small-scale attacks.
•
The threat
from Islamist terrorists, including Al Qaida, will increase in the
event
of war with
Iraq.
•
Attacks in
the UK could include use of chemical and biological agents,
probably
on a
small-scale (though potentially causing significant alarm). But
conventional
attacks
remain more likely. UK interests are now on a par with US targets
for
some
Islamist terrorists, although the US is likely to remain the
priority for most.
•
Both large
and small-scale attacks overseas could include use of
chemical,
biological
(or radiological) materials.
•
Bin Laden’s
11 February statement is probably linked to Al Qaida’s
intent
to attack
Coalition targets in the event of war with Iraq, rather than
intended
to trigger
attacks before then.
•
There are
differences within the leadership of Al Qaida over strategy,
although
these do
not so far appear to indicate any diminution of the
threat.”
47
JIC
Assessment, 19 February 2003, ‘International Terrorism: The Current
Threat from
Islamic Extremists’.
48
Report
Security Service, 18 February 2003.
49
JIC
Assessment, 19 February 2003, ‘International Terrorism: The Current
Threat from
Islamic Extremists’.
215