9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
773.
On
developments in Anbar, Mr Dowse explained that, since October
2006, Prime
Minister
Maliki and the MNF had been backing an initiative where local armed
tribal
groups were
being allowed to assume local security responsibilities – including
control
of police
stations. Although it was far from finished, there were indications
that AQ‑I
was feeling
the pressure in Anbar. The extent of popular support for the trial
opposition
to AQ‑I was
difficult to gauge but Mr Dowse considered that the impact so
far was
encouraging.
774.
Mr Dowse
reminded Sir Nigel of the JIC’s judgement in February that the
prospects
for Anbar
would depend on the initiative gaining broader support among the
Sunni
population.
That would be difficult as long as rival groups were competing for
local power
and
influence. There was also a risk that, if they prevailed against
AQ‑I, the Sunni tribal
forces
would redirect their energies against the Iraqi
Government.
775.
On 3 May, in
response to a request from Sir Nigel, the Deputy Chief of
the
Assessments
Staff provided a minute on Lebanese Hizballah involvement in
training
Shia groups
in Iraq.424
It
said:
“Lebanese
Hizballah has well‑established links to Shia groups in Iraq
…
In May 2004
MNF first reported explosives technology exclusively
associated
with
Hizballah (EFPs: explosively formed projectiles) being used in
Iraq. More
sophisticated
EFPs (using passive infra‑red initiators) appeared in December
2004.”
776.
The minute
said that the arrangements put in place by Hizballah for training
Iraqis
who wanted
to attack the coalition were assessed to have been put in place at
the
request of
the Iranians. It continued:
“We assess
that the main recipients of Hizballah training are Shia extremists
(mainly
members of
Jaysh al‑Mahdi (JAM) but also some from the Badr
Organisation);
although …
a small number of Iranian‑backed Sunnis may also have been
trained …
Skills
include small‑arms and explosives training and instruction in
kidnapping,
assassination,
surveillance and reconnaissance.”
“But what
are we doing about this? Why aren’t we raising it with
Iran?”
778.
In early May,
Ambassador Crocker visited Basra.425
Mr Tinline
reported to
Ms Aldred:
“Ambassador
Crocker’s fleeting visit to the REO [US Regional Embassy
Office]
at Basra
Palace seems to have left a very bleak impression of Basra. Rocket
and
mortar
attacks on the REO dominate US perceptions. Transport
complications
424
Minute
[Deputy Chief of Assessments Staff] to Sheinwald, 3 May 2007,
‘Iraq: Lebanese Training’
including
manuscript comment Blair.
425
Letter
Tinline to Aldred, 3 May 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly Report’.
145