9.5 | June 2006 to 27 June 2007

294. In discussion, it was suggested that what could be achieved in Basra by March

2007 would “probably not be enough to achieve PIC” and so the challenge would be

to “work out how we could complete the process from outside Basra after we had

transitioned”.

295. VAdm Style provided an update on Op SINBAD, which he considered had

been a “considerable success”, although progress on reforming the Iraqi police

remained weak and attack levels against coalition forces remained high. Mrs Beckett

and Sir Suma Chakrabarti, DFID Permanent Secretary, reported that the impact of

the withdrawal of civilian staff from Basra Palace on Better Basra and on DFID’s

programmes had been “marginal”.

296. Mrs Beckett summed up that officials should develop some clear and agreed

forward planning on the future of the civilian and military presence in Basra.

297. VAdm Style told the Inquiry:

“SINBAD was a very considerable success. Yes, in some senses conditions were

deteriorating in Basra, and again it depends on exactly which little bit of time that

you are thinking about … But amongst the things that were achieved out of SINBAD

were a new level of co‑operation between our own forces and the Iraqi Army, better

Iraqi Army and police co‑operation, both the police and the army effectiveness –

Iraqi Army effectiveness were improved, extra equipment was brought in. There

was better – there was improving support from the Council and most of the authority

within Basra because they approved of what was being done. Consent temporarily

improved, it had all the time been generally reducing, and the murder rate went

down. By the end … the Iraqis were in the lead to an extent they had not been

before.”164

298. On 17 November, Mr Jonathan Powell sent a minute to Mr Blair with his thoughts

on Iraq.165 He wrote that there was “a new fluidity in Iraq after months of stasis” which

offered an opportunity to change strategy on Iraq and to change the way Iraq was seen

in the West.

299. Mr Powell suggested that there was a need to “be more imaginative” to get out of

the “bunker mentality” in which both politicians and civil servants found themselves and

“change our way of working to take advantage of the opportunity”. Part of the answer

would be the new “Forward Plan”, which would focus discussion.

300. Mr Powell also recommended that the list of attendees at the “weekly meetings”

needed to change, commenting “I think we need a general as well as CDS” and that

Mr Blair should have fortnightly video conferences with UK personnel in Iraq and with

the US.

164 Public hearing, 5 January 2010, page 39.

165 Minute Powell to Prime Minister, 17 November 2006, ‘Iraq’.

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