The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“We must
not allow an outlaw regime that incites and uses terror … to
threaten the
world by
developing the ultimate weapons of terror … the civilised world
must come
together to
deal with the threat posed by the Iraqi regime.”
279.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock advised on 3 September that none of the
options
identified
by the FCO for a draft resolution, giving Iraq an ultimatum which
might
then
provide legal cover for military action, would be achievable. Even
a challenge
to Iraq to
accept UN inspections would face “considerable
opposition”.
280.
Sir Jeremy
advised that the UK should focus on the elimination of
WMD
rather than
regime change, and choose its tactics “with
circumspection”.
281.
Mr Blair
had concluded on 30 August that the UK strategy should be a new
UN
resolution
which would become an ultimatum to Iraq.93
282.
Sir Michael
Jay had asked Sir Jeremy Greenstock for his “considered
advice
on the
handling of a Security Council resolution on Iraq in preparation
for the Prime
Minister’s
visit to Camp David at the end of the week”.94
283.
Sir Jeremy
replied to Sir Michael on 3 September addressing a draft FCO
letter to
No.10
provided by Mr Stephen Pattison, Head of UN Department in the
FCO, “on the
options for
Security Council Resolutions aimed at putting pressure on Iraq and
preparing
the ground
for enforcement action”.
284.
Sir Jeremy
described the FCO draft as raising three
possibilities:
•
a
resolution “specifically authorising the use of
force”;
•
a “softer
text determining a flagrant violation or material breach by Iraq
of
previous
SCRs”; and
•
a
“middle‑ground resolution aimed at provoking an indisputable
example of Iraqi
intransigence
by calling for the re‑admission of Inspectors with a tight
timetable
and more
intrusive powers”.
285.
Sir Jeremy
advised that none of those options was yet achievable and only
the
second was
“likely to stand much chance of success after further work”. He
wrote:
“We start
from a point where the other 13 members of the Council will, at
best,
have
serious doubts about the use of force. Despite the attractions from
our and
the US
perspective of a clear and ‘in your face’ justification for the use
of force,
there is
bound to be strong resistance to this in the Council. Nor would we
have
the
necessary nine votes for an explicit pre‑authorisation in the event
of continued
Iraqi
non‑compliance. There will even be considerable opposition to
throwing down
93
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 30 August 2002, [extract
‘Iraq’].
94
Letter
Greenstock to Jay, 3 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Handling in the
Security Council’.
144