The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
49.
Adm Boyce
also said that SDR readiness levels were not being
met:
“For
instance, a division should be capable of being produced in 90
days21
but
it would
now be difficult to produce two thirds of a division in 6 months,
with
consequences
on Iraq (US lead time by contrast would be 3 months).”
50.
In addition,
“resources were needed for new investment to secure
information-
dominance
for the war on terrorism/asymmetric threats”.
51.
Mr Hoon
described the three levels of funding that were
required:
“(1) to
deliver the SDR assumptions;
(2) to
modernise equipment/training to deliver a modern Armed Forces;
and
(3) to get
the capabilities right post-11 September.”
52.
Sir Kevin
“said the priority was filling gaps in capabilities”.
53.
In July
2002, the MOD published a follow-up to the 1998 SDR which
confirmed
that the
shift towards expeditionary operations was likely to become
more
pronounced.
54.
In July 2002,
the MOD published The Strategic
Defence Review: A New Chapter;
an update
on the SDR’s progress and a consideration of the “UK’s defence
posture and
plans” in
light of the 9/11 attacks.22
55.
The MOD stated
it was likely that the trend towards expeditionary
operations
would
“become even more pronounced”. While the core regions identified in
the SDR –
Europe, the
Gulf and the Mediterranean – were likely to remain “the primary
focus” of
UK
interests, it was “increasingly clear that a coherent and effective
campaign against
international
terrorism – and indeed other contingencies – may require
engagement
further
afield more often than perhaps we had previously
assumed”.
56.
On the Armed
Forces’ ability to conduct multiple, simultaneous
operations,
the MOD wrote:
“The
capability of our forces is strained not just by the scale of
operations, but by
the number
of simultaneous or near-simultaneous operations. Since the SDR
we
have
assumed that we should plan to be able to undertake either a single
major
operation
(of a similar scale and duration to our contribution to the Gulf
War in
1990‑91),
or undertake a more extended overseas deployment on a lesser scale
(as
in the
mid-1990s in Bosnia), while retaining the ability to mount a second
substantial
deployment
– which might involve a combat brigade and appropriate naval and
air
21
This text
reflects what is recorded in the note but is not what the SDR
stated; it specified that a
framework
division should be ready within 90 days.
22
Ministry of
Defence, Strategic
Defence Review: A New Chapter, July
2002.
10