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4.4  |  The search for WMD
“But I agree, we’re not in disagreement at all. The search must continue.”
620.  Mr Blair discussed the ISG with President Bush on 28 January.342 Mr Blair said
that the first ISG Report showed that Saddam Hussein had been in breach of multiple
Security Council resolutions. When the next report came it would be necessary to
ensure that it was properly presented.
621.  Mr Duelfer wrote in his memoir that Dr Kay’s testimony, “We were all wrong”, had
sounded conclusive even though Dr Kay had been declaring that Iraq was violating UN
resolutions throughout the 1990s and in the lead-up to the war:
“Aside from angering the staff he left in Iraq, Kay’s declarations made it much
more difficult to collect information from Iraqi sources. Once the world had heard
the decrees of the former ISG leader, why should any of the Iraqis provide further
information?”343
The Hutton Report, 28 January 2004
622.  On 28 January, Lord Hutton published his report into the circumstances
surrounding the death of Dr Kelly.344 The principal conclusions of the Hutton Report
relating to the September 2002 intelligence dossier and the 45 minutes claim are
addressed in Section 4.2.
623.  Commenting on the Hutton Report at the meeting of the JIC on 28 January,
Mr Scarlett said:
“The JIC’s reputation had taken a knock in the short term but it was important to
keep things in proportion. There continued to be great respect for the JIC and what
it represented. The JIC’s higher profile as a result of the Hutton Inquiry carried
implications however that would need careful managing.”345
624.  Mr Scarlett also thanked the Committee members and the Assessments Staff for
their support.
625.  After the publication of the Hutton Report, the Government sent its deferred
response to the 11 September 2003 ISC report Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction –
Intelligence and Assessments.346
626.  In response to the ISC’s criticism that the 9 September 2002 JIC Assessment,
‘Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons – Possible Scenarios’ (see Section 4.2),
did not highlight in the Key Judgements the uncertainties and gaps in UK knowledge
342  Letter Rycroft to Adams, 28 January 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Conversation with Bush, 28 January’.
343  Duelfer C. Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq. Public Affairs, 2009.
344  Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly C.M.G.
by Lord Hutton, 28 January 2004, HC 247.
345  Minutes, 28 January 2004, JIC meeting.
346  Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee Report on Iraqi Weapons of Mass
Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments, 11 September 2003, February 2004, Cm6118.
547
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