3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
resolution
incorporating an ultimatum without convincing evidence of a
greatly
increased
threat from Iraq.
391.
It would
not be easy to persuade the US to support an ultimatum given
the
US concerns
to avoid a resolution which would constrain its
freedom.
392.
An
ultimatum issued by the US/UK might have presentational utility
but
it would
have no legal force.
393.
Mr Simon
McDonald, Mr Straw’s Principal Private Secretary, responded
to
Mr Rycroft
on 26 July with advice on “how to get the Security Council to issue
some sort
of
ultimatum ahead of any military action”.157
394.
The letter
reflected advice from the UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New
York
and the
British Embassy Washington and a list of elements which might be
incorporated
in a new
resolution was enclosed with the letter. It was envisaged
that:
•
Iraq’s
failure to co-operate would be condemned as a “flagrant violation”
of
its obligations;
•
the
ultimatum would take the form of a demand for UNMOVIC and the IAEA
to
be allowed
“immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access”;
and
•
the
resolution would declare that, if Iraq did not comply, it would be
clear that
it had
“no intention of complying with its obligations”.
•
To carry
conviction an ultimatum would have to be “couched as a Chapter
VII
Security
Council resolution” deciding that Iraq is in “flagrant violation of
SCR
687 and
other relevant resolutions” and calling on Iraq to allow
“immediate,
unconditional,
and unrestricted access to any and all areas”, as specified
in
resolution
1284 (1999), by a given date.
•
There were
“likely to be formidable obstacles to overcome” to secure
a
resolution
“unless there was convincing evidence of a greatly increased
threat
from the
Iraqis”.
•
The US
“vigorously asserted the right of individual Member States to
determine
whether
Iraq has breached the cease-fire” set out in resolution 687
(1991),
“irrespective
of whether the Council” had “made such an assessment”.
The
US would
“argue against establishing an ultimatum which they would see
as
interfering
with that right”. The US would “also argue that faced with a
credible
ultimatum
Iraq would make a show of co-operation to secure a delay, muddy
the
waters and
split the Council”; and that Iraq would restrict the inspectors’
access
to
facilities.
157
Letter
McDonald to Rycroft, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Ultimatum’ attaching
Paper ‘Elements which might be
incorporated
in an SCR embodying an ultimatum to Iraq’.
69