13.1 |
Resources
the budget
nor the mandate to fund that type of assistance. Mr Hoon said
that funding
should come
from the “Op TELIC reserve”. Mr Stephens, representing
the Treasury,
said that
some money could come from the Reserve but that the Treasury would
also
want to
look at the GCPP.
596.
Mr Boateng’s
Private Secretary wrote to Mr Hoon’s Principal Private
Secretary
on 18
October, proposing the creation of a ring‑fenced allocation for “ad
hoc security
proposals”
within the GCPP.367
Copies of
the letter were sent to Mr Straw’s and
Mr Benn’s
Private Offices.
597.
By 22 October,
No.10, Mr Hoon’s Private Office and Mr Benn’s Private
Office had
all
responded to that letter, rejecting the Treasury’s
proposal.368
No.10
commented that
it was
imperative that the MOD proposal be funded in full as soon as
possible.
598.
Mr Boateng
advised the 28 October meeting of the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group
on
Iraq that,
of the US$107m worth of equipment requested by the MOD, US$29m
would
be funded
by the US.369
The
remaining US$78m (some £40.6m) could be funded by the
Treasury
from the Reserve on a “one‑off” basis.
599.
A Treasury
official advised Mr Boateng in mid‑November that there had
been three
separate
occasions where “Ministers and officials from FCO and No.10” had
made
promises of
military equipment to various organisations “without proper
analysis of
the
requirement or clarifying the availability of UK
funding”.370
Normally
effective MOD
internal
scrutiny processes had been bypassed. Treasury officials were
working with
the MOD
to ensure that such proposals were scrutinised, but for this to be
effective the
FCO and
No.10 needed to “work with the process”.
600.
A Treasury
official advised Mr Boateng on 1 December that the Treasury
had
received
the MOD’s first request for funding in relation to the MOD
proposal, totalling
£15m.371
The request
was “basically a list of kit that £15m will buy”, but it was not
the
right time
to “dig our heels in”. The MOD had promised that future requests
for funding
would meet
UOR standards.
601.
In a Note to
President Bush on 10 January 2005, Mr Blair described the
Iraqiisation
of security
forces as critical but said that he was not convinced that the plan
to deliver
this was
robust enough.372
Mr Blair
confirmed that he had authorised “an extra $78m
from our
MOD for the Iraqi Forces in the South”. Although he could not be
sure that
funding was
essential, “I’ll take the risk rather than find six months later it
was.”
367
Letter
PS/Boateng to Baker, 18 October 2004, ‘Iraq Security
Proposals’.
368
Letter
Malik to Rosenfield, 21 October 2004, [untitled]; Letter Rogers to
Rosenfield, 21 October 2004,
‘Iraq
Security Proposals’; Letter Baker to Rosenfield, 22 October 2004,
‘Iraqi Security Proposals’.
369
Minutes, 28
October 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
meeting.
370
Briefing
Treasury, [undated], ‘Iraq Ministerial Meeting – Thursday 11
November 2004’.
371
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chief Secretary, 1 December 2004,
‘£40m Equipment for Iraq Forces’.
372
Letter
Sheinwald to Hadley, 10 January 2005, [untitled] attaching Note
Blair to Bush, 10 January 2005,
‘Note’.
543