The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Ambassador
Bremer, had been persuaded by those arguing that “the
recommended
policy of
covering all four levels was pitched right”. Mr Sawers
commented:
“This new
policy is tougher than your advice preferred … But I advise against
any
action in
Washington. The new policy is badly needed, and it corresponds with
the
preferences
of all the members of the Leadership Group bar
Allawi.”
54.
On the same
day, Mr Llewellyn provided advice to IPU on a draft Order
removing
the Ba’ath
Party leadership.34
It is clear
from his comments that this was the final draft
of what
became CPA Order No.1 and he noted that it was probably on the
point of being
issued.
55.
In
Mr Llewellyn’s view, the main question was whether the UK was
satisfied
that
displaying images or likenesses of Saddam Hussein (or other readily
identifiable
members of
the former regime or symbols of the Ba’ath Party) was of sufficient
concern
that it
necessitated prohibition on the grounds of security and/or public
order, the only
grounds
that would be permitted under international humanitarian
law.
56.
CPA Order
No.1, “De‑Ba’athification of Iraqi Society”, was issued on 16 May
2003.35
It was
Ambassador Bremer’s first formal act as head of the
CPA.
57.
The Order
stated that it was implementing General Franks’ disestablishment of
the
Ba’ath
Party in his 16 April message:
“… by
eliminating the party’s structures and removing its leadership from
positions
of authority
and responsibility in Iraqi society. By this means, the
Coalition
Provisional
Authority will ensure that representative government in Iraq is
not
threatened
by Ba’athist elements returning to power and that those in
positions
of authority
in the future are acceptable to the people of
Iraq.”36
58.
The Order
stated that disestablishment was to be achieved by removing
“full”
members of
the Ba’ath party (defined as the top four ranks of party
membership)37
from public
sector jobs and banning them from future employment in the public
sector.
59.
Individuals
holding senior management positions (the top three layers
of
management)
in all public sector organisations would be interviewed and
assessed
for their
possible affiliation with the Ba’ath Party, criminal conduct and
risk to security.
Any who
were found to be full members of the Ba’ath Party would be removed
from
employment.
34
Minute
Llewellyn to [Bristow], 15 May 2003, ‘Draft Order on Removing
Ba’ath Party Leadership’.
35
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. Threshold,
2006.
36
Coalition
Provisional Authority Order Number 1, 16 May 2003, Section
1(1).
37
Regional
Command Member, Branch Member, Section Member and Group Member.
Collectively
referred to
as “Senior Party Members”.
12