The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

207. Sir Kevin commented:

“This seems satisfactory for the time being, although we shall need to watch to

ensure that (b) does not begin without you being present and that (c) provides the

framework we need to link effectively with the contingency planning in the MOD

(and perhaps to begin to consider tricky issues of wider relevance, eg the effect on

energy prices and oil aftermath management). I should have preferred Bowen to run

a restricted officials forum, given the other pressures on Manning’s time, the need

to begin setting a regular rhythm, and some of the wider issues to be confronted.

But I do not think we can do better for the present.”

208. At official level, the cross-Whitehall Ad Hoc Group on Iraq (AHGI) met for the first

time on 20 September 2002. It became the principal forum for co-ordination of planning

and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein or post-conflict Iraq (see Section 6.5).

209. Mr Bowen told the Inquiry that when the AHGI started its work in September 2002,

the context was “a serious policy commitment to deal with weapons of mass destruction

in Iraq”.123 Conflict was just one of “any number of outcomes”.

COBR(R)

210. In his 12 September minute to Mr Blair, Sir David Manning recommended that he

should chair an “Inner Group”, to include the JIC, the FCO, the MOD, SIS, the Security

Service, GCHQ, the Home Office and Sir David Omand.124

211. A “Wider Group”, tasked by the Inner Group and chaired by OD Sec, would include,

additionally, DFID, the Metropolitan Police, the Treasury, the Department of Trade and

Industry and media specialists from No.10 and the FCO.

212. The Inner Group, which discussed a range of issues including counter-terrorism

and Afghanistan and was not minuted (although actions were recorded in some

instances), was known as the Restricted COBR or COBR(R); the wider group was

the AHGI.

213. Sir David Manning told Mr Blair that:

“This Wider Group would be tasked as necessary by the Inner Group.”

214. When he reported the new arrangements to Mr Hoon on 17 September,

Sir Kevin Tebbit explained that the Prime Minister had decided there should be no

Ministerial meetings at this stage, but that twice weekly Restricted COBR meetings

chaired by Sir David Manning and a wider officials’ group under Mr Desmond Bowen

(Mr McKane’s successor), should begin their work.125 Sir Kevin commented:

123 Public hearing, 7 December 2009, page 10.

124 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 12 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.

125 Minute Tebbit to Secretary of State, 17 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Machinery of Government’.

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