The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• Procurement. Iraq derived billions of dollars between 1999 and 2003 from oil

smuggling, kickbacks and abuse of OFF, money which was outside the control

of the UN. Iraq imported banned military weapons and technology and dual-use

goods through OFF contracts.

• Denial and deception. The ISG had uncovered more details about Iraq’s efforts

to deceive UNSCOM and then UNMOVIC right up to the invasion in March 2003.

• Biological and chemical weapons. The ISG had new information on Iraq’s dual-

use facilities and research into short-notice production of CBW. “Iraq did have

facilities suitable for the production of biological and chemical agents needed for

weapons. It had plans to improve and extend and even build new facilities.”

• Nuclear weapons. ISG analysis suggested “Iraqi interest in preserving and

expanding the knowledge needed to design and develop nuclear weapons”.

• Delivery systems. The ISG had continued to uncover “a very robust program for

delivery systems that were not reported to the UN. New information has been

discovered relating to long range ballistic missile development and Unmanned

Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).”

• Regime intent. Mr Duelfer had instilled a new focus on the question of regime

intent. It was “critically important to understand the intentions of the regime”

when putting other activities into context.

771.  Mr Blair commented on the absence of media coverage of Mr Duelfer’s testimony:

“Amazing it got no publicity. Sh[oul]dn’t we now publicise it? What is our Iraq SCU

[Strategic Communications Unit] doing?”427

772.  Sir Nigel Sheinwald advised that the Government “sh[oul]d not try to publicise this

Report now”. He asked Mr David Quarrey, a Private Secretary in No.10, to discuss the

issue with Mr Scarlett, the MOD and the FCO before putting advice to Mr Blair.428

773.  On 8 April, Mr Quarrey advised Mr Blair:

“The Report received little coverage, although it did usefully get some information

into the public domain. But things have moved on now. In current circumstances

(ie the security situation) it would be extremely difficult to get further coverage in

anything other than negative terms.”429

427  Manuscript comment Blair on Minute Scarlett to Sheinwald, 30 March 2004, ‘ISG’.

428  Manuscript comment Sheinwald on Minute Scarlett to Sheinwald, 30 March 2004, ‘ISG’.

429  Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 8 April 2004, ‘ISG’.

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