The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
11.
For instance,
in a statement to the House of Commons on 24 February
1998,
Mr Blair
stated that “nothing else” apart from “effective diplomacy and firm
willingness
to use
force” would have changed Saddam Hussein’s mind and produced a
signed
agreement
with the UN:
“Throughout
the dispute, our aim has been a peaceful, diplomatic
settlement.
There was
no desire on either side of the Atlantic to use force, but it was
also clear
to us
throughout that Saddam Hussein only understands and respects force
…
“… As Kofi
Annan said in Baghdad: ‘You can achieve much by diplomacy, but
you
can achieve
a lot more when diplomacy is backed by firmness and
force.’
“I would
put it this way: with Saddam, diplomacy plus force equals
success.”1
“Saddam
Hussein has spent seven years playing for time, but has been
thwarted
by the
resolve of the international community. It is now clearer than ever
that his
games have
to stop once and for all. If they do not, the consequences should
be
13.
Regime change
became the officially-stated objective of US policy after the
passage
of the Iraq
Liberation Act in October 1998.
14.
Following
further disputes about access for weapons inspectors and the
withdrawal
of the
inspectors, the US and UK attacked a series of targets in Iraq in
December 1998,
in
Operation Desert Fox. Its objective was described by Mr Blair
as:
“… to
degrade the ability of Saddam Hussein to build and use weapons of
mass
destruction,
including command and control and delivery systems, and to
diminish
the threat
that Saddam Hussein poses to his neighbours by weakening his
military
15.
The impact of
Operation Desert Fox is addressed in Section 4.1
16.
In a press
conference on 20 December 1998, Mr Blair explicitly ruled out a
“land
war in Iraq
with literally hundreds of thousands of allied troops engaged” and
called for
a future
strategy based on containment and stability for the region
including a credible
threat of
force if Saddam posed a threat to the neighbourhood or developed
WMD.4
17.
By that stage,
the Security Council was deeply divided on policy towards Iraq
and
the other
three Permanent Members of the Security Council did not support the
US and
UK use of
force.
1
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 24
February 1998, columns 174-175.
2
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 24
February 1998, column 176.
3
House of
Commons Official
Report, 17
December 1998, volume 322, columns 1097-1102.
4
Press
conference, 20 December 1998 (as reported in Le
Monde diplomatique).
314