3.3 | Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002

48. Subsequently, Sir Jeremy added:

“Somehow, the need to stop smuggling through Syria got caught up with the need

not to offend or to make too expensive the Turkish and Jordanian angles to this

… I regarded it as a pity that more pressure was not put on all three because the

business of smuggling was more important than the business of maintaining that

part of the relationship with those three countries … I understood that was the

choice of the United States, not to expend capital on stopping the smuggling …

there were equivocal views within the US Administration about how much effort and

energy and capital to expend on maintaining sanctions and a containment regime

that might, anyway, not do the trick.”21

49. Mr Blair told the Inquiry that the fact that the provisions to tighten the borders could

not be agreed with Russia was important, and that, while the sanctions framework

agreed in the resolution might have been successful, it was “at least as persuasive

an argument that it wouldn’t have been”.22

50. Asked whether containment was still the policy of Government, Lord Wilson of

Dinton, Cabinet Secretary from January 1998 to September 2002, responded:

“… Containment was the status quo … No-one questioned it. No-one said, ‘…

Let’s discontinue that as a policy.’ It was noted as a success … After that [Cabinet

discussion on 16 May 2002] there was no further discussion of containment … for

it to end you would need to have a discussion about it. There was no discussion

about it.”23

51. Lord Wilson stated that Mr Blair had been disappointed that concessions had been

made to secure Russian support for the resolution, and regarded it as a significant

weakness.24

52. Lord Wilson, told the Inquiry that the “Americans had got engaged in getting it

[the resolution] through”.25

53. In his memoir, published in 2012, Mr Straw wrote:

“… resolution 1409 was inadequate and stood no chance of plugging the gaping

holes in the sanctions framework. This failure to get comprehensive and robust

‘smart sanctions’ effectively marked the end of the ‘containment’ policy, especially

for those of us who regarded Iraq as a significant threat.”26

21 Public hearing, 27 November 2009, pages 26-27.

22 Public hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 15-16.

23 Public hearing, 25 January 2011, pages 43-44.

24 Public hearing, 25 January 2011, page 45.

25 Public hearing, 25 January 2011, page 76.

26 Straw J. Last Man Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor. Macmillan, 2012.

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