9.3 | July 2004 to May 2005

210. Ms Vivien Rose, Head of the General and International Law Team in the MOD,

wrote to Ms Cathy Adams, Legal Counsellor to Lord Goldsmith, setting out details.107

Her letter drew out the parallels with UK operations in Afghanistan and supplied

a detailed new Targeting Directive modelled on the one in use there.

211. In a telegram to the FCO in London on 12 October, Mr Chaplin wrote that he

suspected the ISF would be less ready by the end of October than Iraqi Ministers

were claiming.108

212. Mr Chaplin also reported that Gen Casey had:

“… concluded that a major operation before Ramadan is not possible, but has

produced a hybrid military option to keep up pressure on the insurgency, while

responding to Allawi’s concerns about an Iraqi face on any full scale operations

in Fallujah.”

213. In a further telegram the following day, Mr Chaplin supported Lt Gen McColl’s

10 October recommendation that the UK should backfill US troops in North Babil, seeing

it as an opportunity to “make a real contribution to the success of the Fallujah operation”

without joining the operation directly or deploying a battlegroup to Baghdad.109

214. Both Mr Chaplin and Lt Gen McColl recalled the UK’s rejection of two requests

for a deployment beyond MND(SE) over the summer, which had led to criticism and a

sense “that we have a lot to say for ourselves, but that when it really matters – getting

stuck into the insurgency, contributing to SSR acceleration – we prefer to look the other

way” and that “we have it a bit easy in MND(SE)”.

215. Mr Chaplin observed that if the UK wanted to retain influence over plans to take

action in other insurgent areas, it needed to “build up a bit of credit”.

216. At Cabinet on 14 October Mr Straw’s update on Iraq focused on the need for

more UN effort to support election preparations.110 UN reluctance to deploy more staff

was a result of the attack on its HQ in August 2003. It remained unclear which forces

would provide protection. Nonetheless, preparations were “on track” for elections in

January 2005.

217. In the Agenda for the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq on 14 October, Cabinet

Office officials advised Mr Blair:

“You may want to conclude the discussion of security by asking Geoff Hoon to

comment on initial … drawdown of forces in early 2006.”111

107 Letter Rose to Adams, 15 October 2004, ‘Operations in Iraq: Revision of the Op TELIC targeting

directive and the position of embedded personnel’.

108 Telegram 271 Baghdad to FCO London, 12 October 2004, ‘Iraq: update on Fallujah operational

planning: comment’.

109 Telegram 274 Baghdad to FCO London, 13 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Deployment of UK Battlegroup’.

110 Cabinet Conclusions, 14 October.

111 Agenda, 14 October 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq meeting.

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