The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
more
specialised options) should be costed.150
That would
enable the Government to
assess how
much it wished to devote to securing a degree of influence over US
policy
and
operations, in terms of risk to UK troops, the opportunity cost of
withdrawing from
other
operations, and the financial cost.
270.
The Treasury
told the Inquiry that Mr Brown decided not to write to the
MOD.151
271.
On 4 July, the
JIC assessed the cohesion of the Iraqi regime.152
It
acknowledged
an absence
of “detailed knowledge about the significance of particular
motivators and
alternative
loyalties (eg to tribe versus State) for regime insiders”, but
judged that “real
loyalty and
support for Saddam Hussein’s regime is confined to the top of the
hierarchy”.
272.
The JIC
reported, as had earlier DIS papers, that Ba’ath Party membership
was
compulsory
for anyone holding an official position and that the “extensive
party network
provides
all-pervasive oversight of Iraqi society, with representatives in
most Iraqi social,
government
and military organisations”. While the Sunni officer corps of the
Iraqi military
was likely
to remain loyal, the Shia rank-and-file was less likely to, and
mass desertions
seemed
likely.
273.
On 11 July, Lt
Gen Pigott sent a revised version of the SPG paper on UK
military
strategic
thinking to a limited number of senior MOD
addressees.153
274.
The only
change to the material on post-conflict planning in the June
edition of the
paper was
the addition of references to the “weakness” of US planning, which
needed
“much
greater definition”.154
275.
The advice
from the SPG was discussed in a restricted Chiefs of Staff meeting
on
17 July,
described in more detail in Section 6.1.155
At the
meeting, Adm Boyce concluded
that “the
UK needed greater visibility of US intent in a number of
areas”.
276.
In his
discussions with President Bush at Crawford in April, Mr Blair
set
out a
number of considerations that were subsequently described by
others
as “conditions”.
277.
The Cabinet
Office paper, ‘Iraq:
Conditions for Military Action’, was issued
on 19
July to inform Mr Blair’s meeting with Mr Straw, Mr Hoon, Lord
Goldsmith
(the
Attorney General) and key officials on 23 July.
278.
The paper
advised that an analysis of the post-conflict phase was among
the
preparations
needed to fulfil Mr Blair’s “conditions”.
150
Minute Nye
to Bowman, 5 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
151
Email
Treasury to Iraq Inquiry, 26 February 2010,
[untitled].
152
JIC
Assessment, 4 July 2002, ‘Iraq: regime cohesion’.
153
Minute
DCDS(C) to MA/CDS, 11 July 2002, ‘UK Military Thinking on Iraq’
attaching Paper [SPG],
11 July
2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’.
154
Paper
[SPG], 11 July 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
155
Minutes, 17
July 2002, Chiefs of Staff (Restricted) meeting.
160