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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
more specialised options) should be costed.150 That would enable the Government to
assess how much it wished to devote to securing a degree of influence over US policy
and operations, in terms of risk to UK troops, the opportunity cost of withdrawing from
other operations, and the financial cost.
270.  The Treasury told the Inquiry that Mr Brown decided not to write to the MOD.151
271.  On 4 July, the JIC assessed the cohesion of the Iraqi regime.152 It acknowledged
an absence of “detailed knowledge about the significance of particular motivators and
alternative loyalties (eg to tribe versus State) for regime insiders”, but judged that “real
loyalty and support for Saddam Hussein’s regime is confined to the top of the hierarchy”.
272.  The JIC reported, as had earlier DIS papers, that Ba’ath Party membership was
compulsory for anyone holding an official position and that the “extensive party network
provides all-pervasive oversight of Iraqi society, with representatives in most Iraqi social,
government and military organisations”. While the Sunni officer corps of the Iraqi military
was likely to remain loyal, the Shia rank-and-file was less likely to, and mass desertions
seemed likely.
273.  On 11 July, Lt Gen Pigott sent a revised version of the SPG paper on UK military
strategic thinking to a limited number of senior MOD addressees.153
274.  The only change to the material on post-conflict planning in the June edition of the
paper was the addition of references to the “weakness” of US planning, which needed
“much greater definition”.154
275.  The advice from the SPG was discussed in a restricted Chiefs of Staff meeting on
17 July, described in more detail in Section 6.1.155 At the meeting, Adm Boyce concluded
that “the UK needed greater visibility of US intent in a number of areas”.
276.  In his discussions with President Bush at Crawford in April, Mr Blair set
out a number of considerations that were subsequently described by others
as “conditions”.
277.  The Cabinet Office paper, Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’, was issued
on 19 July to inform Mr Blair’s meeting with Mr Straw, Mr Hoon, Lord Goldsmith
(the Attorney General) and key officials on 23 July.
278.  The paper advised that an analysis of the post-conflict phase was among the
preparations needed to fulfil Mr Blair’s “conditions”.
150  Minute Nye to Bowman, 5 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
151  Email Treasury to Iraq Inquiry, 26 February 2010, [untitled].
152  JIC Assessment, 4 July 2002, ‘Iraq: regime cohesion’.
153  Minute DCDS(C) to MA/CDS, 11 July 2002, ‘UK Military Thinking on Iraq’ attaching Paper [SPG],
11 July 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’.
154  Paper [SPG], 11 July 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’.
155  Minutes, 17 July 2002, Chiefs of Staff (Restricted) meeting.
160
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