10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
•
provided
for the continued operation of the DFI and the IAMB. DFI funds
would
be
disbursed in a transparent and equitable manner and through the
Iraqi
budget,
solely at the discretion of the Iraqi Government. Funds held within
the
DFI would
continue to be immune from attachment.
408.
A junior
Treasury official advised Mr Brown that the explicit reference
to
transparency
and the requirement for DFI funds to be disbursed through the Iraqi
budget
had been
inserted at the UK’s request.221
409.
The British
Embassy Washington reported to the IPU on 23 June on US plans
in
the oil
sector after 30 June.222
410.
Senior US
interlocutors had told the Embassy that all 12 members of the CPA
Oil
Team were
expected to leave Iraq by the end of August. They would be
succeeded by
a number of
oil sector “liaison officers” within the US Iraq Reconstruction
Management
Office
(IRMO). The liaison officers “would obviously have less influence
and leverage”
than the
CPA Oil Team. Mr Thamir Ghadban, Iraqi Minister of Oil, “did
not need
telling
what to do, and would want to distance himself from the US
advisers”. The US
understood
that Mr Ghadban intended to set up his own Advisory
Group.
411.
The Embassy
assessed that the US remained focused on short-term
production
issues,
rather than “strategic industry restructuring and
governance”.
412.
The Embassy
also reported that policy responsibility for the oil sector within
the US
Administration
would transfer from the DoD to the State Department on 30
June.
413.
Hard
Lessons recorded that,
at the end June 2004, Iraq was producing more than
2m bpd of
oil, still well below pre-war production of 2.58m
bpd.223
Resolution
1483, which was adopted on 22 May 2003, provided that disbursements
from
the
Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) would be “at the direction of the
Authority [the US
and UK as
Occupying Powers], in consultation with the interim Iraqi
administration”.224
By that
time, the US was committed to a protracted Occupation and it was
not clear when
an interim
Iraqi administration would be established.
221
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chancellor, 10 June 2004, ‘Iraq –
UNSCR 1546 and Financial
Management
Law’.
222
Letter FCO
[junior official] to IPU [junior official], 23 June 2004, ‘Iraq
Oil: US Plans post 30 June’.
223
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office,
2009.
433