6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
860.
Mr Bowen
wondered whether:
“A way
through this … would be to make a commitment in principle to
Package 3,
but on the
basis that we cannot accept the current planning assumption date
for
a
Presidential decision. That would force the US military to exclude
us or have a
serious
discussion about the realism of their timetable …”
861.
Mr Bowen
also suggested that the offer of Package 3 might be made
“dependent
on US
leadership in the North and willing co‑operation by the
Turks”.
862.
Mr Bowen
wrote that pressure on Saddam Hussein needed to be
maintained.
“Continued
planning” together with activities that were “necessary to prepare
for action”
would “all
play their part” in that. The UK should be “persuading the
international
community
and our domestic audience that proper preparation for war” was “the
best
way to
avoid it”.
“Overall, I
fear we are enmeshed in a military planning cycle which operates
out
of synch
with the political track. But it is only planning. Provided we
enter the right
caveats and
get a realistic re‑think about the timelines … I think there is
advantage
in our
being involved in planning for the North (unless the political view
is definitely
that we
should confine ourselves to the sea and air
packages).”
864.
The MOD
advised Mr Blair on 29 October that its influence on US
planning
was
reducing and the option to deploy UK ground forces was at risk of
being
excluded by
default. The only way to avoid that was to offer Package 3 to the
US
for
planning on the same basis as Package 2.
865.
Package 3
could also significantly reduce the UK’s vulnerability to
US
requests to
provide a substantial and costly contribution to
post‑conflict
operations.
866.
Mr Watkins
wrote to Sir David Manning on 29 October, to report that “US
military
planning
[was] continuing, but increasingly assuming no UK Land
contribution”; and that
an option
for a “significant UK land contribution” could be “sensibly kept
open only by
placing it
on a similar basis” to Package 2.342
867.
The MOD
advised that it had “become clear over the past few days” that the
US
military
had begun planning on the assumption that the UK would
“not
contribute
ground
forces and
consequently, will not pursue the question of UK involvement with
Turkey”.
The US had
also decided to commit the 4th US Infantry Division:
“… which
would mean that the option of the UK commanding the operation from
the
North at
divisional level has gone. This does not necessarily mean that we
could not
342
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 29 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Options’.
307