7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
376.
Mr Jonathan
Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff, told the
Inquiry:
“… the
Prime Minister had a habit of writing notes, both internally and to
President
Clinton and
to President Bush, on all sorts of subjects, because he found it
better
to put
something in writing rather than to simply talk about it orally and
get it much
more
concretely … in focused terms.”176
377.
Mr Blair
drew on information and briefing received from Whitehall
departments,
but
evidently drafted many or most of his Notes to the President
himself, showing
the drafts
to his close advisers in No.10 but not (ahead of despatch) to the
relevant
Cabinet Ministers.
378.
How best to
exercise influence with the President of the United States is a
matter
for the
tactical judgement of the Prime Minister, and will vary between
Prime Ministers
and
Presidents. In relation to Iraq, Mr Blair’s judgement, as he
and others have
explained,
was that objectives the UK identified for a successful strategy
should not
be expressed
as conditions for its support.
379.
Mr Powell
told the Inquiry that Mr Blair was offering the US a
“partnership to try
to get
to a wide coalition” and “setting out a framework” and to try to
persuade the US
to move
in a particular direction.177
380.
Mr Blair
undoubtedly influenced the President’s decision to go to the UN
Security
Council in
the autumn of 2002. On other critical decisions set out in the
Report, he did
not succeed
in changing the approach determined in Washington.
381.
There was a
vigorous debate in late 2002 and early 2003 about the legal
effect
of
resolution 1441 and the question of whether military action against
Iraq could be
undertaken
without the Security Council having first considered, and then
assessed,
whether or
not Iraq was in breach of its terms.
382.
Many
distinguished jurists have expressed opinions on that question and
the
debate will
no doubt continue. The Inquiry received many opinions from experts
in
international
law which demonstrate the complexities of the issues.
383.
The Inquiry
has reviewed the debate that took place within the Government
and
how it
reached its decision.
384.
The
circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there was a
legal basis
for UK
participation were far from satisfactory.
385.
It was not
until 13 March 2003 that Lord Goldsmith advised that there
was,
on balance,
a secure legal basis for military action.
176
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, page 38.
177
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, pages 77-78.
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